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ABSTRACT
Europeanization of the Estonian Electricity Sector: Historical Legacies and
Security Concerns
Madis Ehastu
Estonia, generally considered a Europhile country, is showing the first signs of opposition to
supranational European Union (EU) policies. This is because the EU‟s energy- and climate
policy‟s trinity of policy directions- creation of an internal market, security of supply and
environmental sustainability- are problematic in regard to the the case of Estonian electricity
sector. The Estonian actors‟ response to adaptational pressures caused by the EU, a process
that is generally understood as Europeanization, thus provides us with a useful case study to
determine what conditions limit the EU‟s attempts to influence domestic politics. Research
indicates that the main reason for Estonian opposition is the country‟s historical legacy in the
form of the oil shale complex that was built during the Soviet rule. The small size of the
Estonian electricity market, the relative poverty of the state and the inability of the politicians
to decide for the future development of the sector have been identified as factors that along
with the historical legacy continue to influence Estonian domestic energy- and climate policy.
Because of this complex interdependence of factors, the EU‟s aims to create an open internal
market and to increase environmental sustainability cannot be achieved without threatening
the security of Estonia‟s domestic electricity supply. This, in turn, is because the EU- wide
policy has been driven by states, such as Germany, France and United Kingdom that have not
taken into account the peculiar conditions in the EU‟s Eastern borderlands. This, in turn, has
led Estonia to use the energy security “clause” to gain support on the EU- level and to defend
its interests.

I have written the work independently. All works of other scholars, their principled positions, and data
from written sources and from elsewhere that have been used in preparing this this work have been
cited.

……………………………………………………………….
/the author’s signature/

iii

Table of Contents
Introduction............................................................................................................................................. 1
1.

The concept of Europeanization ...................................................................................................... 4

2.

Importance of the electricity sector: energy security..................................................................... 14
2.1.

Estonian perceptions of energy security ................................................................................ 18

3.

Historical legacy of the Estonian electricity sector ....................................................................... 25

4.

Empirical findings and analysis: development of EU and Estonian energy policies .................... 28
4.1.

1991- 1995: Early stages of EU and Estonian energy policies .............................................. 28

4.1.1.

EU energy policy ........................................................................................................... 28

4.1.2.

Estonian energy policy .................................................................................................. 29

4.2.

1995- 2004: Estonia as an EU candidate state ....................................................................... 32

4.2.1.

Estonia and the EU ........................................................................................................ 33

4.2.2.

EU energy policy ........................................................................................................... 33

4.2.3.

Estonian energy policy .................................................................................................. 38

4.3.

2004- 2011: Estonia as a new EU Member State .................................................................. 47

4.3.1.

EU energy policy ........................................................................................................... 47

4.3.2.

Estonian energy policy .................................................................................................. 49

Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................... 63
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................... 67

iv

Introduction
Estonia, generally considered a Europhile country, is showing the first signs of opposition to
supranational European Union (EU) policies. In the field of electricity market reform, it has
lobbied for stricter third party access to the European internal market and has gone to court
together with Poland against the European Commission‟s nationally allocated greenhouse gas
emission quotas. According to a study by the Estonian electricity transmission system operator
Elering OÜ, Estonian electricity production will in 2016 decrease to the level where domestic
supply will be unable to cover approximately 20- 25% of peak consumption.1 By 2025, if no
additional production capacities are installed, the number will probably increase to almost 80%.
This means that electricity will have to be imported from other states. Because electricity is seen
as a strategic commodity to the functioning and development of a state and its economy, the
decreasing supply appears as a security threat. All states seek to create conditions that will
guarantee the availability of domestic electricity to avoid dependence on foreign energy supplies.
Estonia, at the moment has, failed to do so for the near future.
Estonia‟s domestic electricity supply decrease is not based on dysfunctional energy generation
capacity, but rather on a change of convergence related to its membership in EU. Upon
negotiating accession to the EU, Estonia agreed to harmonize its legislation and standards wit that
of the EU. The problem is that almost all of Estonian electricity is produced in an
environmentally unfriendly way and Estonia is required to cut emissions either by improving the
technology or finding new ways to produce electricity.
European integration has led various stakeholders in the Estonian electricity sector to respond to
adaptational pressures because of a „misfit‟ between EU- and domestic level policies. This
process is generally understood as Europeanization. Unlike its approach in many other fields,
Estonia has been actively opposing EU requirements to implement change in its electricity sector.
It is thus essentially opposing Europeanization. Hence, Europeanization of the Estonian
electricity sector provides us with a useful case study to learn about the concept of
Europeanization, the main purpose of this thesis.

1

OÜ Elering, “Eesti Elektrisüsteem varustuskindluse aruanne (Security of supply report of the Estonian electricity
sector),” Tallinn (2010): 14.
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In this context, the main research question of the thesis is to explore the conditions that limit the
effectiveness of the EU‟s attempts to influence domestic politics. Or particularly, what are the
conditions that have led Estonia to oppose Europeanization in its electricity sector?
The more specific research tasks are the following: (1) to review the relevant Europeanization
literature and to derive hypotheses from it, (2) to study the Europeanization process in a historical
perspective and to find the historical legacies that influence contemporary decision- making, and
(3) to find the conditions that limit Europeanization in the case of the Estonian electricity sector.
The theoretical framework of this study is drawn from relevant Europeanization literature.
Previous works suggest that the deepest understanding of the process of Europeanization in a
specific case can be achieved by studying it in historical perspective, paying particular attention
to historical legacies that have a longstanding influence. Thus, change in the Estonian electricity
sector should be studied since its establishment in the early 20th Century. Of specific interest are
the larger infrastructural objects that were built during the period of Soviet rule as it is suggested
that such legacies have a strong influence on the process of Europeanization. Attention is also
paid to the unique characteristics of the electricity sector and its importance for a state‟s economy
and security. It is thus expected that profound changes in the electricity sector will be met with
greater opposition than in other sectors.
Since Estonia has joined the EU relatively recently, greater attention is paid to scholarship on
Europeanization of candidate and new member states. Europeanization is generally considered to
be a two- way process- Member States upload policies to and download policies from the EU
level. For candidate states, however the process is instead characterized by conditionality,
meaning that it is a one- way process where EU policies are only downloaded. Hence,
Europeanization can take different forms depending on the relationship between a state and the
EU. Thus, the empirical part of the thesis is divided into three parts, focusing on different aspects
of the EU‟s influence on Estonia.
In the first period (1991- 1995, the first four years of Estonian reindependence), Estonian politics
were influenced relatively little by the EU. Thus, the period can give some insights about the
values and beliefs of the politicians about the further development of the electricity sector was
2

seen. The second period (1995- 2004, Estonia as a candidate state) is characterized by the
strongest influence of the EU on Estonian politics because of its stronger negotiating position.
This allows us to identify the mechanism of Europeanization and to evaluate the conditions under
which Europeanization was effective in the case of a candidate state. After Estonia became an EU
Member State, it also received the right to upload policies to the EU level. This period allows us
to evaluate the conditions under which EU‟s influence is effective on the domestic level in the
case of a new Member State.
The research relies on various primary and secondary sources such as pieces of legislation, policy
papers, various reports, journal and newspaper articles, and academic books. The sources give a
good idea of the official policies of both the EU and Estonia. The policies‟ background is
somewhat revealed in various academic works and newspaper articles, but not entirely. For this
reason, more comprehensive and profound results can be achieved in the future by conducting
interviews with some of the people involved in the process.

3

1. The concept of Europeanization
European integration has generated a number of research agendas. The impact of the EU on the
candidate or member states‟ polities, policies and politics has been researched through conceptual
models such as multi- level governance, policy networks, and Europeanization. Of these,
Europeanization is perhaps best suited for policy outcomes research on the domestic level.
Europeanization has been criticized as an amalgam of „meso‟ and „grand‟ theories of European
integration as it is drawing from neo- functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, neoinstitutionalism and from social constructivist approaches.2 Thus, Europeanization is in itself an
approach, as it provides a simplified model of reality that has explanatory power. As Angelos
Sepos writes “borrowing insights with rationalist and constructivist roots can often be useful in
explaining [different] case studies.”3
Not a new term, Europeanization emerged as a theme in the 1980s and was deployed as a
research agenda relatively recently.4 Its popularity, especially related to the Central Eastern
European Countries (CEEC), has been gradually increasing.5 There are ongoing discussions over
the definition of the concept, but all reveal a number of common themes and conclusions. One of
the first attempts to capture its meaning was made by Robert Ladrech in 1994: Europeanization,
he writes can be understood as “an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of
politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational
logic of national politics and policy- making.”6 The definitions slightly differ according to the
scholars‟ approaches and thus emphasis is placed on its different aspects. According to Sepos,
Radaelli argues from a similar perspective saying that
“Europeanization consists of processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalization
of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, „ways of doing things‟
and shared beliefs and norms that are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy

2

Angelos Sepos, The Europeanization of Cyprus: Polity, Policies and Politics (New York: Palgrave, 2008): p 1.
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
According to Kevin Featherstone and Claudia Maria Radaelli, The politics of Europeanization (Oxford University
Press, 2003): 5; and Ulrich Sedelmeier, „Europeanization in new member states and candidate states,“ LivingReviews
in European Governance, 6(2011):7.
6
Cited in Ian Bache, Europeanization and multilevel governance: cohesion policy in the European Union and
Britain (Rowman and Littlefield, 2008): 10.
3
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process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse (national and
subnational), political structures and public policies.”7
A slightly different point of view is given by scholars working with the notion of référentiel,
arguing that “there is Europeanization when the EU becomes the referential (Sepos‟ emphasis)
(i.e. the reference point) of domestic political action.”8 Olsen perhaps gives the broadest
definition as he distinguishes between five different uses of the term: it had been understood as
changes occurring in external territorial boundaries, development of institutions of governance at
the European level, penetration of national and sub- national systems of governance, exporting
forms of political organization and governance that are typical and distinct for Europe beyond the
European territory and as a political project aiming at a unified and politically stronger Europe.9
Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier provide the simplest definition by saying that Europeanization
is “a process in which states adopt EU rules.”10 Sedelmeier puts it more simply, saying that the
term is being generally used as shorthand for „influence of the EU‟ or „domestic impact of the
EU‟.11 He also identifies the main research questions being asked when studying Europeanization
and says that they can be generally boiled down to the following one: “under what conditions are
the EU‟s attempts to influence candidate countries effective? Or in other words: what factors
explain variation in the EU‟s influence across countries and issue areas?”12
It is important to acknowledge that Europeanization is not synonymous with convergence,
harmonization or European integration, as it is concerned with what happens once EU institutions
are in place and produce their effects.13 Thus, “it is not concerned with why and how Member
States produce European integration, and whether the EU is more inter- governmental or
supranational- rather it aims to bring domestic politics back into understanding European
integration.”14 Consequently, whereas European integration theories aim to explain the dynamics

7

Sepos 2008, p 2.
Ibid, p2.
9
Johan P.Olsen, „The Many Faces of Europeanization,“ Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2002): 3-4.
10
Frank Schimmelfenning and Ulrich Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, (Cornell
University Press, 2005): 7.
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Sedelmeier 2011, p 5.
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Ibid., p 9.
13
Sepos 2008, p 2.
14
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and outcomes of European integration, Europeanization is a better way of understanding
domestic effects.15
Specifically, Börzel and Risse have identified two preconditions for Europeanization to occur.
First, Europeanization must be „inconvenient‟, essentially meaning that there must be some
degree of „misfit‟ between EU- level processes compared to domestic processes. “This degree of
misfit leads to adaptational pressures, which constitute a necessary but not sufficient condition
for explaining domestic change.”16 Second, various facilitating actors at the domestic level must
respond to adaptational pressures.17
Scholars have also identified a number of Europeanization mechanisms, generally depending on
the theoretical basis of the research or the type of process they induce (top- down or bottomup).18 Sepos identifies two main approaches: the rationalist approach whose emphasizes the
notion of „optimality‟ and the constructivist approach which logic is based on the notion of
„appropriateness‟. In the former, actors follow a certain policy because they believe it would reap
the greatest rewards whereas in the latter, actors follow a certain policy because they perceive it
to be appropriate in terms of their beliefs, ideas and norms. Sedelmeier agrees with this view, but
points out that both schools generally draw on the institutionalism theory for their research, with
some exceptions. Cristoph Knill and Dirk Lehmkull are more specific as they have identified
three mechanisms of domestic impact of European policy-making: European policies might be
very prescriptive, and demanding Member States to comply with specific requirements; they may
be limited to changing domestic opportunity structures; or they may be without any direct
institutional impact at all since they primarily aim to change domestic beliefs and expectations.19
The first mechanism resembles most the logic of „optimality whereas the third one resembles
most the logic of „appropriateness‟. They also point out that the successfulness of the
Europeanization process consists of two steps: the existing constellation and opportunity
structures at the domestic level which determine the direction of domestic change. Thus, the

15

Ibid., p 3.
Tanja A.Börzel and Thomas Risse, „Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe,“ in The Politics of
Europeanization, ed. Keith Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli (Oxford University Press, 2003): 2.
17
Sepos 2008, p 3.
18
Ibid., p 3.
19
Cristoph Knill and Dirk Lehmkull, „The national impact on European Union regulatory policy: Three
Europeanization mechanisms,“ European Journal of Political Research 41(2002):257.
16
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authors rely on an institutionalist approach.20 These insights help to understand what to look for
when evaluating the process of Europeanization. Accordingly, there must be a „misfit‟ between
EU and domestic policy levels and facilitating actors who respond to adaptation pressures. The
process itself varies between the logics of optimality and appropriateness.
In relation to Central- and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), research has focused on
“contemporary structures, institutions and actor dispositions such as power asymmetries between
the EU and the candidates, the size and credibility of EU incentives for reform, the state of
democratization, the composition of East European governments and the constellation of veto
players in their political systems.”21 Recently, more attention has been paid to the historical
legacies of these countries from both the communist period and before, and how they affect the
Europeanization process. This is increasingly important in the case of new Member States where
Europeanization is increasingly dependent on “political structures and resource endowments that
have been shaped by legacies.” Since further enlargement has lost momentum, Europeanization‟s
successfulness and its limits might be “conditioned by historical legacies both in East European
countries and East- West relations.”22 Historical legacy is sometimes used as synonymous with
path- dependency, but it is argued that the “scope for political actors to appropriate, reject or
construct historical legacies may be greater than commonly assumed” because they do have the
ability, as rational actors, to consciously respond to their environment by reconfiguring their
legacies “even if the successful capacity of actors to reconstruct and reinvent their past histories
or geographical space will be determined by the prevailing „structural constraints and historical
circumstances‟.”23 This suggests that Estonian energy policy is not entirely determined by
historical legacies, although it may be greatly influenced by it.
Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig introduce the role of legacies in three different ways. 24 First,
legacies as deep conditions give the explanations of enlargement and Europeanization more
historical and causal depth, attaining the “status of proximate causes or intermediate steps in the
causal path from legacies to contemporary outcomes” and explaining the “contemporary

20

Knill & Lehmkull 2002, p 262.
Arista Maria Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig, Frank, „Europeanization Before and After Accession: Conditionality,
legacies and Compliance,“ European- Asia Studies 62(2010): 422 .
22
Ibid, p 422.
23
Ibid., p 430
24
Ibid., p 431- 437
21

7

constellation of actors, interests, ideas, power and institutions” as being shaped by the communist
and pre- communist periods.25 Second, legacies as enduring conditions suggest that the relevance
of the legacies varies over time as they might be “sidelined or overridden by other powerful
short- term factors” but felt increasingly in the longer run.26 Third, legacies as encompassing
conditions refer to a „deeper‟ factor that is causing both the explanatory factor27 and the outcome,
meaning that both a state‟s receptivity to change and its effects are caused by historical
legacies.28
However, the most widely used approach to understand change in candidate countries and new
Member States is the contrasted use of the term conditionality. Examples of this include:
contrasting „incentives‟ and „normative pressure‟, „conditionality‟ and „convergence‟ through the
„spread of norms‟, „external incentives‟ and „social learning‟ or distinguishing between
„compliance‟ and „communication‟.29 They all derive from the notion of „transformative power‟
of the EU, which rests largely on „active‟ and „passive leverage‟. 30 The latter refers to the
attractiveness of EU membership and the expected benefits that follow; the former refers to the
criteria of membership that consist of both the acquis communautaire and transfer of European
beliefs, values and norms to the domestic level. Theory thus suggests that, in case of
Europeanization, change has occurred due to EU‟s „transformative power‟, but its nature depends
on the specific case studied.
The most appropriate model for understanding change in both Central and Eastern Europe
candidate and new Member States that includes the approaches described above, was introduced
by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier in their book The Europeanization of Central and Eastern
Europe (2005). Sedelmeier has since improved it in a recent literature review article. The model
differentiates between theoretical origins (rationalist institutionalism vs. constructivist
institutionalism) and the driving force behind the change (whether driven domestically or by the

25

Ibid., p 431- 432
Ibid., p 432
27
That, in this case, is explained as being an excessively shallow explanation of the Post- Communist regime
diversity.
28
Cirtautas & Schimmelfennig 2010, p 435.
29
Sedelmeier 2011, p 11.
30
Tim Haughton , “When Does the EU Make a Difference? Conditionality and the Accession Process in Central and
Eastern Europe,” Political Studies Review 5(2007): 235.
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EU). Against this background, they created a taxonomy that helps to visualize this
interdependence (Figure 1).
Logic of rule adaptation
Principal actor in rule Logic of consequences (rational Logic

of

appropriateness

adoption process

institutionalism)

(constructivist institutionalism)

EU- driven

External incentives model

Social learning model

CEEC- driven

Lesson- drawing model

Lesson- drawing model

Figure 1: Alternative mechanisms of Europeanization
Rational institutionalism follows the logic of consequences (or logic of „optimality‟) that mainly
focuses on the EU-s use of its active leverage and the processes it induces on the domestic level.
The EU‟s strategy is to require clear and credible demands of conditionality while offering
adequate rewards and linkages to Western Europe while sustaining efficient monitoring
capacity.31 The success of Europeanization depends on factors that determine the adaptation costs
for the governments because of historical legacies, on actor density and the number of veto
players, and on the administrative capacities of the target country. 32 Constructivist
institutionalism, on the other hand, follows on the logic of appropriateness that focuses on the
mechanisms of socialization and persuasion and on how convinced are the candidate and new
member states of the legitimacy and the intrinsic value of the EU demands, rather than material
incentives. In this approach, the EU‟s strategy is merely to promote a set of rules that is seen as
legitimate by the target states and doing so through a process that is also seen as being
appropriate. If the candidate and new member states consider the EU‟s conditions as legitimate,
they are more likely to adopt the rules. Conditionality is thus seen as a process that involves the
target state‟s participation whereby they success of change is more likely if soft tactics are used
with low density demands. Europeanization is thus seen more as a learning process. Research
indicates that it is more likely to occur when the rules are already codified internationally or in
the EU‟s own acquis, when the rules are not more onerous than for the incumbents and when
they are normatively consistent and based on a strong international consensus on the technical
and political appropriateness of policy prescriptions.33 The target states‟ politics are characterized
31

Sedelmeier 2011, p 13- 14.
Ibid., p 14- 15.
33
Ibid., p 15- 16.
32
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by the term normative resonance. Successful Europeanization is more likely when states identify
themselves positively with the EU and when “there is a „cultural match‟ or „resonance‟ between
EU demands and domestic rules and political discourses.” An important factor is transnational
networks that connect target countries‟ and EU elites who cooperate in adopting legislation. In
this case, obstacles to EU influence are seen as institutional fluidity of programmes and the
politicization of projects. The success is also dependent on the individuals involved.34
In Sedelmeier‟s review of CEECs Europeanization literature, this taxonomy has, to a large extent,
proven to be effective. He, however, does point out a conceptual gap that is becoming more
evident: the specification of domestic politics- veto players, actor density, domestic costs- as a
mediating factor of EU‟s influence; these “often remain rather broad and are therefore subject to
ad hoc operationalization.”35 As a result, analysis of domestic costs is on kept separate from the
impact of these costs, or in other words, a “target government‟s opposition is often taken as an
indicator of high domestic adjustment costs, without sufficient analysis of why the these
governments perceived EU demands are costly, and how such costs could have been
operationalized and assessed prior to the analysis.”36 This is also why analyzing facilitating actors
in the process of Europeanization in the Estonian electricity sector is important, along with the
historical legacies and domestic costs.
Electricity market liberalization specific literature has mostly concentrated on Western Europe.
Paolo Nardi draws attention to four particular approaches in the literature: the creation of
effective institutions at the EU level that is also be called „Europeification‟ or
„Vergemeinschaftung (communitarization)‟, infrastructural integration and, in particular, the
interconnection among Member States; emergence of a clear group of energy utilities
characterized by a European dimension; and convergence towards similar standards in industrial
organization, including market regulation, market opening and completion, and network
unbundling.37 In his analysis of the electricity markets and policies, he relies on Börzel‟s
taxonomy of Member State behavior and strategy in the Europeanization process that identifies

34

Ibid., p 16.
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35

10

three groups of countries: pace- setters, foot- draggers and fence- sitters.38 Per Ove Eikeland
looks at the third liberalization package through a multi- level governance approach as he
describes the power asymmetries between the Commission and the Member States finding that
the Commission was relatively successful in imposing its will and the opposing Member States,
opinions were not decisive. He also finds that non- state actors and forces outside the EU had a
relatively strong influence on the proposal for the third liberalization package, albeit indirectly. 39
Fabio Domanico‟s analysis focuses on market incumbents in the electricity sector and on the
problems that the liberalization process creates. He finds an increasing trend towards market
concentration mostly due to the lack of interconnection between the Member States, lack of
effective privatization in some Member States, ineffective unbundling, the absence of
independent regulatory authorities and rules that foster the creation of „national champions‟.40
David Levi- Faur analyzed the „net impact‟ of Europeanization to the telecommunications and
electricity sectors in 2002 and arrived at the conclusion that Europeanization was merely a
mediating factor and that liberalization would have occurred even without the Commission‟s
demands.41 In analyzing the Europeanization of the French electricity market, Pierre Bauby and
Frédéric Varone observe four paradoxes: the electricity sector remains concentrated, creating a
scope for incumbent operators to influence prices; an illiquid market due to the facts that
companies are active both in production and in the retail market, and insufficient unbundling of
network and supply activities; limited interconnections between Member States prevent the
development of integrated EU energy markets; and lack of transparency benefits incumbents and
undermines the position of new entrants.42 Finally, Laura Deitz, Lindsay Stirton and Kathryn
Wright focus on nine South East European countries (SEE)- Albania, Bosnia- Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Serbia
and the United Nations Mission on behalf of Kosovo- to evaluate whether the states in question

38

Ibid., p 3-4.
Per Ove Eikeland, “EU Internal Energy Market Policy: New Dynamics in Brussels Policy Game?” Fridtjof Nansen
Institute Report 14(2008).
40
Fabio Domanico, “Liberalization of the European Electricity Industry: Internal Market or National Champions?”
Worldenergy.org (2007).
41
David Levi- Faur, “On the „Net Impact‟ of Europeanization. The EU‟s telecoms and electricity regimes between
the global and the national,” European Integration online Papers 6(2002).
42
Pierre Bauby and Frédéric Varone, “Europeanization of the French electricity policy: four paradoxes,” Journal of
European Public Policy 14(2007).
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are able to meet the requirements of EU‟s energy related acquis communautaire. 43 Because the
performance levels of the SEE countries‟ governing institutions are much lower than of the EU
25, they might not be able to successfully close the energy chapter of the acquis. They find that
the most important attractions for Europeanization are EU‟s offers of private investment,
technical policy- making competence and geopolitical security of supply whereas obstacles for
Europeanization are unpopular domestic policy outcomes such as price increases that in turn
creates challenges for the economy to develop at an adequate speed and undermines welfare.
These are also the main reasons given as limits to Europeanization.
Of the articles briefly reviewed here, only the last addresses the conditions that affect the
successfulness or limits of Europeanization. Particularly, the „misfit‟ or even an obstacle to
successful Europeanization is the relative poverty of the South East European states. The other
articles mainly study the discrepancies between the Commission‟s policy goals and the reality in
respective Western European electricity sectors. No generalizations on conditions that are
suggested to be true in all cases of Europeanization are drawn. This is perhaps because it is
recognized that conditions in each state are different, and because the studies mainly concentrated
on only a small number of cases. I can thus expect that the Estonian case will have some unique
characteristics that will help us to further understand Europeanization, and that its relative low
level of development affected Europeanization at least in the earlier stages, as the case of SEE
countries suggest.
In conclusion, a theoretical overview of the concept of Europeanization allows me to set the
following hypotheses. In order for there to be Europeanization in the Estonian electricity sector,
there must be a misfit that leads to adaptational pressures that can be described as inconvenient,
and various facilitating actors must be identifiable. It is suggested that the deepest understanding
of the case can be achieved by studying the sector in a historical perspective, while paying
particular attention to its historical legacies.
Hypothesis 1: There is a misfit between EU level and domestic level policies that leads to
adaptational pressures for the domestic facilitating actors.
Hypothesis 2: Historical legacies influence contemporary politics.
43

Laura Deitz, Lindsay Stirton and Kathryn Wright, „South East Europe‟s electriicty sector: Attractions, obstacles
and challenges of Europeanization,“ Utilities Policy 17(2009): 4-12.
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After establishing the misfit, the facilitating actors and the historical legacies, I will evaluate the
mechanism(s) through which Europeanization has occurred. In order to do so, I will evaluate
which logic, optimality or appropriateness, best describes the process. This essentially helps us to
understand the factors influencing the process and whether it characterized more by the external
incentives, the social learning or lesson- drawing model.
Hypothesis 3: Europeanization has occurred because of EU-s superior bargaining position that
has led to an ability to threaten with noncooperation and thereby force Estonia to make
concessions (external incentives model).
Hypothesis 4: Europeanization has occurred because Estonia has been motivated by internalized
identities, values and norms, and thus legitimacy of rules, appropriateness of behavior, persuasion
and complex learning characterize the process of rule transfer and rule adoption in the Estonian
electricity sector (social learning model).
Hypothesis 5: Europeanization has been induced by Estonia itself because the EU requirements
have been seen as effective remedies to inherently domestic needs and policy challenges (lessondrawing model).
(Hypotheses 6 and 7 can be found in the end of the next chapter.)
In the final part, I aim to evaluate whether Europeanization in the Estonian electricity sector has
been successful or not, i.e. is there still a misfit or have the EU and domestic level policies fully
harmonized. After establishing this, I aim to point out the factors that explain variation in the
EU‟s influence in the case of the Estonian electricity sector.
In order to achieve the goals described above, I will rely on primary sources such as laws,
regulations, policy papers and discussions in Riigikogu (Estonian Parliament). It would have also
been useful to conduct in- depth interviews with specialists to get more precise answers to my
questions, but this must be left to future research. I also use secondary sources, such as books,
journal articles and newspaper articles.

13

2. Importance of the electricity sector: energy security
The ultimate goal of a rational individual, community or state is to survive. Consequently, any
actor aims to increase its security by having as few existential threats as possible. Or in other
words, limiting issues that are “presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent
object (traditionally, but necessarily, the state, incorporating environment, territory and
society).”44 The word “to present” indicates that security is a tool that can be politically used
against or through a “referent object.” Existential threats thus have to be perceived as being
threats before counter- actions can be taken. This is understood as the normative dilemma in the
concept security. The term is thus a word that can be used as a political tool in creating “the
other” through fear and used for oppressive action or social and political exclusion. Or as
Huysmans explains, security is a thick signifier, a concept with different meanings that organizes
social relations into security relations.45 Security or threats, for that matter, are always social
constructs that are perceived by a social group.
An understanding of energy security essentially comes from threats perceived by a social group
to their ability to consume energy in order to maintain and develop as a society. This is a social
relation as other societies use energy for the same aims.
Security in terms of energy is relevant because of the unequal distribution of natural resources in
the world. It is a longstanding problem, whether talking about gold or silver mines in the 17th
century or deposits of oil, gas and uranium today. “John Locke‟s insistence of the primacy of
contract over conflict in the debate with his mercantilist contemporaries was as valid as it is
now.”46
Looking at history, energy has played a substantial role in conflict. One could argue that energy
resources played a major role in both Gulf Wars and the escalation of conflict in Libya today has
partially happened because of its energy resources. The peaceful utilization of energy resources
was also one of the underlying reasons in founding the European Union (EU). The establishment
of two of the three Communities (EURATOM and European Coal and Steel Community) of the
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European Communities was carried by this idea. At that time, coal and steel were two of the most
important substances for industry after the Second World War. A supranational authority was
thus created in order to strengthen and control the markets and ensure peace.47
In comparison, Europe has been unfortunate in terms of allocation of energy resources by nature.
It is facing a gradually growing dependency on imports as domestic resources are being
exhausted by ever- rising demand. If “business as usual” is maintained, the European Union‟s
energy import dependence will grow from 54% of total EU consumption today to about 70% in
2030. Reliance on imports of natural gas is expected to increase from 57% to 84% by 2030, of oil
from 82% to 93%.48 There are only a limited number of energy suppliers, frequently in
geopolitically unstable regions (e.g. Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia). The rapid
growth of China and India is increasing competition over the suppliers‟ energy resources. Some
observers have also been “startled by China‟s dynamism in securing physical energy supplies, in
particular in African countries.”49 The pressure on global energy is thus intense, carrying both
political and economic risks. Global demand for oil is expected to grow by 41% by 2030 but it is
unclear how supply will keep up. The International Energy Agency (IEA) sees only modest
increases in oil production because of constraints on investment in its 2010 World Energy
Outlook.50 It not only increases risk of supply failure but also growth in prices.
The best way to overcome these problems in the EU is unclear. Some energy experts support the
view that the Community should have the task of formulation energy security policy. They see a
solution to the supply and price problems through a liberalized market where energy exchange
between Member States is guaranteed at any time (e.g. by stock exchange and solidarity options
at a time of crisis). A transnational authority should oversee the system because “a failure to
adopt adequate measures in one Member State can have serious consequences for the operation
of the internal market throughout the EU and beyond.”51 Thus a degree of cooperation should be
created and a Community framework of action adopted as it is difficult to adopt broader
necessary measures, such as creating a stable relationship between importing and exporting
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countries that are undertaken at the Member State level alone. Other energy experts argue that
“national governments can better guarantee the security of energy supply independently from the
community, due to their familiarity with their own specific market.” 52
These two divergent views are forming the approaches in the discussion on the division of
competencies in the European Community. It is thus a twofold problem as it has an internal and
an external dimension. The challenge is not just to find solutions for energy supply but also
providing energy at a with reasonable price and keeping sustainable development in mind.53
One of the basic principles of today‟s society is that a free and a well- functioning market is the
most efficient way to operate the economy. There, however, are exceptions to this rule and in
some cases, government intervention in the economy is necessary to make up for the market‟s
failure to bring about the most optimal allocation of resources.54 The reasons for this are
generally recognized as the following four: market power, incomplete information, externalities
and public good. In terms of energy, and electricity in particular, the last two factors are of
particular interest. Externality refers to “a cost or benefit that is ignored by the market in the
determination of prices,”55 and goods or services have public good characteristics if “once they
are created they all are available to all consumers and cannot be withheld from one individual
without withholding them for all.”56 There are thus external costs and benefits that are not
present in the internalized market decisions m eaning that reallocation of resources could achieve
a higher level of public welfare. In regards to security of electricity supply, it is justified for the
government or the system regulator to guarantee supply through reserve capacity. Without these
measures, the market may tend to produce a level of energy security that is less than optimal from
the society‟s point of view. Market regulation is thus needed, but the extent of regulation depends
on political decisions. Regulation, however, can have a pivotal effect on electricity markets
because electricity has an unusual nature compared to most other commodities. It is either
impossible or uneconomical to store. Once produced, electricity must be consumed. Also, its
consumption is seasonal and even changes greatly from one day to the next. The wide use of
electricity in society creates a low tolerance of supply failures as it a key input in all economic
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processes. Because it is a secondary energy source, security of electricity supply depends on
supply of other fuels, adequacy of production capacity and uninterrupted distribution to
consumers. It is the production phase, however, that is subject to additional concerns. Because
electricity is mostly generated domestically, the hazards connected to production, like general
safety issues and environmental problems, are directly related to energy security. Or rather,
concerns over these negative aspects of electricity generation can have a much larger influence
over production capabilities and thus, security of supply. An example of this is emissions trading
that can greatly affect competitiveness of polluting means of production.
The lack of supply of electricity is, on the other hand, seen as hurting a society‟s competitiveness
in a world of societies and is thus perceived to be an existential threat. Electricity production that
generates pollution is thus subject to a political compromise between the environment and
security of supply. The most common definition of energy security is mainly concerned with
availability of primary energy sources but it tends to exclude political aspects. Janusz Bielecki
says that energy security is commonly defined as “reliable and adequate supply of energy at
reasonable prices.”57 Bielecki explains that reliable and adequate supply means “uninterrupted
supply that fully meets the needs of the global economy” and the interpretation of reasonable
prices is perceived differently by energy producers and consumers but in general “it means that
prices are cost- based and determined by the market based on supply/ demand balances.”58 It is
the first part of the definition that tends to be problematic as it treats all economies the same way
and does not take into account different economic environments. This is relevant in regards to
electricity because it does not have a global market price and both its supply and the price are
often dependent on legislation and regulation that may greatly differ between different countries.
Thus, the way electricity is produced becomes important in a specific set of cases although it may
not directly affect reliable or adequate supply. Specifically, cases in which electricity is traded
between two states with significantly different standards, i.e. environmental, affect prices of
electricity and thus competitiveness of the producers in the country with higher standards. But
because electricity is relatively rarely traded in large quantities between two states, it seldom is
included in discussion over energy security. In relation to EU, energy trade with third countries
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may be problematic as it may consequently lead to greater dependency on electricity supply that
may in turn create other issues over the reliability of supply. It is essentially an issue of trust as
solidarity between EU Member States in a time of crisis can generally be expected, but not to the
same degree in relation to third states. Thus, extensive dependence on foreign energy supplies
can be seen as a security threat, especially at a time of crisis. Examples from history, such as the
1972 OPEC oil embargo and the Russian- Ukrainian gas disputes of 2004 and 2007 support this
view. Also, extensive pollution from emissions, mining or nuclear reactors may pose a different
kind of risks that may relate to living standards and global warming.
Due to different perceptions, definitions of energy security may vary. EU Commission defines
energy security as “the ability to ensure that future essential energy needs can be met, both by
means of adequate domestic resources worked under economically acceptable conditions or
maintained as strategic reserves and by calling upon accessible and stable external sources
supplemented where appropriate by strategic stock.”59 Looking at specific countries‟
contemporary definitions, energy policy is, in the UK, Poland and France, required to firstly
ensure security of supply with reasonable prices but is followed by additional objectives to do it
in a technically and economically justified way including protection of the environment. 60 The
UK perhaps goes furthest by emphasizing acceleration of the transition to a low carbon economy.
This is, however, understandable, as it has been setting the pace of EU energy market
acceleration.

2.1.

Estonian perceptions of energy security

The Estonian electricity system was constructed as a part of the Soviet Union‟s northwest
electricity system.61 This synchronized system, called the IPS/UPS (intermittent current),
currently includes Russia, Belarus, Latvia and Lithuania. This essentially means that in order for
the current to stay at the designated rate required to provide sufficient power, electricity demand
and supply have to be in balance. All the mentioned countries‟ electricity networks are thus
interdependent. Specifically, Estonia‟s connections with Russia have the capacity of 1050MW
(400MW throughput from the Russian side) and the connections with Latvia have the capacity of
59
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750MW.62 There is thus a circulation in the system that could cover the entire Estonian peak
electricity demand. As of the end of 2006, Estonia also has a 350MW direct current connection
(Estlink 1) with Finland and another connection (Estlink 2), with the capacity of 650MW is to be
completed by 2014.63 For the time being, the Estlink connection is the only connection that the
Baltic States have with other EU Member States. For this reason, the Baltic States are sometimes
referred to as an energy island. Estlink 2 will however increase connectivity and connections
between Lithuania and Poland as well as between Latvia and Sweden are being negotiated. This
action is taken under the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP), launched as at the
initiative of Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso at the 2008 autumn European Council,
aiming to fully integrate the Baltic States into the European energy market and to strengthen
interconnections with their EU neighboring countries.64
Estonia has a very small electricity market that is relatively well connected with Russia, Latvia
and, after 2015, with Finland. The small size of the market, however poses some difficulties for
market liberalization, as it may not provide enough demand for a healthy competition, especially
if it‟s accompanied by considerable changes in environmental standards. It is also argued that the
liberalization of a small market can have negative consequences as there might be higher risks to
investors, backlashes to the environment and energy- saving technologies, and negative
influences on the electricity systems‟ security of supply. 65 Thus, in an isolated small market
situation, liberalization might not be feasible. Burinskiene and Rudzkis arrive at a similar
conclusion arguing that the liberalization to the Lithuanian electricity market would be inefficient
and the electricity price would be oriented towards the price of the most expensive and large
producer so that only a small share of electricity could be traded on the free market.66
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Efficient market liberalization would thus require cross border trading between states. For
Estonia, this is possible with any state it has connections with. Of these states, only Russia has
the capacity to significantly export electricity. It has, in fact, been exporting electricity to Finland
and Latvia, which both do not have domestic supply capacities to cover the demand. Lithuania
has been in a similar situation after the closure of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant in 2010. It is
thus highly likely that Estonia will also start to import electricity from Russia as the market opens
and the polluting generation capacities have to be suspended. It becomes even more likely when
we look at the future of electricity prices. In 2009, the Estonian Ministry of Economic Affairs and
Communications estimated the prices to rise between 55- 70% in 2013 as determined by the Nord
Pool electricity exchange. The opening of Estonian wholesale market in April 2009 was
accompanied by a 30- 40% rise in electricity prices for the industrial consumers.67 The CO2
quotas would harm the competitiveness of electricity production from oil shale to an extent that it
would be economically unreasonable.68 Russian electricity producers, however, are not subject to
the same environmental standards as the EU Member States are. The Russian domestic regulated
price has thus been, on average, 50% cheaper than electricity in the Nordic Countries. 69 The
Russian producers would thus be motivated to sell electricity to the Estonian market where the
price would be determined by the Nord Pool exchange, allowing them to profit considerably
more than selling to domestic customers. It appears like a win- win situation as it is believed that
a competitive market will decrease prices for the Estonian consumers. According to the European
Environment Agency, the adjusted for purchasing power Estonian electricity price was indeed
already the fourth lowest in 2007.70 This result, however, had been achieved at the expense of
environmental dumping as the environmental cost is not adequately reflected in the price.
The Estonian government, however, does not see it as a win- win situation as it is concerned over
security issues. Russia is “geo- economic actor endowed with substantial oil and gas reserves”
and its “energy policy has been methodically consolidated over the past decade, with its national
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gas, oil and pipeline companies steadily coming under government control, all effectively
underwriting its national revival, local leverage and regional clout.”71 The EU came to fully
understand this after the 2005- 2006 Ukraine- Russia gas disputes that effectively reduced
Gazprom deliveries to Hungary, Austria, Slovakia, Romania, France, Poland and Italy between
14- 40% during a particularly bitter winter.72 Similar disputes, though with lesser consequences,
occurred between Russia and Belarus in 2004 and 2007.
The basic mechanism is that Russia provides energy sources at a substantially lower price hoping
to buy loyalty or create dependence that will allow the Russian government to have a greater
leverage over the target states‟ policies. The disputes with Ukraine and Belarus arose from the
fact that Russia threatened to increase the energy prices to global market levels that are
substantially higher than what the countries were used to, if certain political demands were not
met. The poor Eastern European countries are not able to pay the higher price, which allows
Russia to cut off energy supplies. This, in turn, is a concern for the EU, as the states in question
are transit corridors for Russian- EU energy trade and their inability to pay the higher prices
affect the EU‟s security of energy supplies. This is one of the main reasons why alternative
pipelines, like Nord Stream and Nabucco, are being built.
This mechanism, however, does not affect Estonia as it is both directly connected to Russian
energy sources through railways, pipelines and an electricity grid; and it is paying the market
price for natural gas. The only disruption in energy deliveries from Russia occurred in the winter
of 1992/1993. Despite of Russian politicians‟ threats, no interruptions in energy deliveries to
Estonian domestic consumption have occurred since.73 One of the reasons for this may be that
Estonia is relatively self- sufficient in terms of primary energy. On average, it imported below
30% of primary energy resources since 1995.74 It is fully dependent on Russian only in terms of
gas, which has accounted for 7- 17% of total Estonian primary energy consumption.75
Nevertheless, Russian political influence in trade is indisputable. It significantly limited transit
with Estonia in response to the 2007 „Bronze Night‟ and with Latvia in response to its proposed
71
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allegedly anti- Russian language bill in 1998. Another example is the 2005 Russian ban on Polish
meat imports after accusing Poland of low veterinary standards, despite the fact that they were
good enough for all EU Member States.
In terms of electricity, the list of government- controlled energy companies also includes Inter
RAO (formerly RAO UES of Russia), “one of the world‟s largest energy holding companies,
accounting for 70% of the energy production and one- third of heat supply in Russia.”76 Martha
Brill Olcott argues that RAO UES aggressively moved into Central Asia in the early 2000s and,
like Gazprom, it “would like to use Central Asian Energy to serve European markets.” 77 Only
instead of oil and gas, it aims to develop hydroelectric power in Kirgizstan and Tajikistan as it is
calculated to be more economical than in Siberia.78 It is, however, unclear whether Inter RAO‟s
dominant situation in the Estonian market would be a security issue. Andres Mäe lists “the
globalization and openness of markets, the connection of Russia‟s companies with political
power, their capability as suppliers, the instability of Russia‟s internal policy and the impact of
energy production and transit on environment” as possible risks to Estonia.79 Even though Inter
RAO is an enormous company by Estonian standards, it does not seem to be willing or even able
to influence Estonian political decision- making. The Estonian market is regulated according to
EU directives; starting from 2013, all trading will be conducted under the rules of the Nord Pool
electricity market and the Estonian transmission system operator, OÜ Elering, is not legally
unbundled from any electricity producers. Despite the fact that the Estonian market is small, Inter
RAO can sell electricity at a higher price, thus making a bigger profit than in its operations in
Russia. Thus, it seems unlikely for the Russian government to use possible Inter RAO‟s
electricity imports to Estonia as a political tool.
The Russian electricity market has also seen its share of reforms in recent years. Since 1st July
2008, RAO UES‟ competitive and monopolistic sectors are fully unbundled. On the same date,
Inter RAO was formed. Since 1st January 2011, the Russian government has stopped regulation
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of the electricity price for large consumers.80 Government control also is expected to be
decreased by the removal of cabinet ministers from boards of energy companies in order to
improve the investment climate.81 For Inter RAO, this means the withdrawal of Igor Sechin, also
known as the Russian oil czar, from the company‟s Board. This move has, however, yet to occur.
The company has also made large investments to commissioning new production capacities in
2006- 2010.82 The general goal of these reforms is to build “a new market- based energy sector
with new opportunities and new investors.”83
In 2007, the most important security policy documents reflected a perception of threat from
Russia and its “energy weapon”. In the Estonian European Union Policy 2007- 2011, the
Government prioritizes transparent and rule- abiding energy cooperation with Russia.84 The
document Principles of Estonian Security Policy states that “there is a [global] competition over
energy resources in order to achieve political and economic power. States and international
organizations aim to increase security of supply to ensure cover their energy demand. States
endowed with energy resources aim to increase their influence as much as possible.”85 It also
states that Russia, in addition to political and economic means, is prepared to use its military
forces to achieve its goals. These means also include Russia using its energy resources “as a
political and an economic tool in different spheres of international relations.”86
Against this backdrop, energy security is seen as an important part of Estonian economic
development. Estonian energy security itself specifically consists of “security of supply, security
of infrastructure, connectedness to other EU Member States‟ energy networks and diversity of
energy sources.”87 The mission of the Estonian electricity sector, as stated in the Estonian
Electricity Economy Development Plan is to “provide the citizens of Estonia with the supply of
electricity that is continuous, sustainable and has a reasonable price.”88 If it can be observed that
the Estonian government is acting as a “foot dragger” or a “fence- sitter” in the electricity market
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liberalization process, it is reasonable to assume that this is because of concerns over energy
security. As I have briefly shown, one of the outcomes of Europeanization of the Estonian
electricity market is a substantial loss of competitiveness that may end electricity production from
oil shale in Estonia. An alternative explanation may be that the government is concerned over a
social crisis that may emerge from shutting down the oil shale industry in Ida- Viru County due
to dramatically decreased competitiveness. I analyze this in the last section of the thesis.
Hypothesis 6: Estonia‟s opposition to Europeanization of the electricity sector is due to energy
security concerns
Hypothesis 7: Estonia‟s opposition to Europeanization of the electricity sector is due to concerns
over a possible social crisis in Ida- Viru County.
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3. Historical legacy of the Estonian electricity sector
The first industrial power plants were built to Estonia at the end of the 19th and the start of the
20th century. Electricity production developed hand in hand with the larger cities and industrial
centers of Tallinn, Tartu, Narva, Pärnu and Kunda.89 Until 1918, hydro power was the main
source of energy in Estonia. Oil shale, an organic- rich fine- grained sedimentary rock, started to
be used as a fuel in industrial sectors, mainly in cement production, in July 1918. The fossil fuel
is found abundantly in Estonia and can be relatively easily extracted, the increased use of it as a
fuel is understandable. Electricity production from oil shale started in 1924. The first larger plant
was built near Tallinn (11MW) in the 1930s, followed by the Kohtla- Järve (1949- 1967, 39MW)
and Ahtme (1952- 1957, 20MW) plants.90 Production capacity was substantially increased with
the construction of two of the world‟s largest power plants that use oil shale as a fuel to generate
electricity and heat, near Narva. The Balti and Eesti power plants were built from 1956- 1966 and
1964- 1973, respectively.91 These two plants formed the core of Estonian energy production as
they accounted for 92% of all installed generation capacity in Estonia (after 1982). 92 They were
built for the purposes of the growing industrial need of St. Petersburg and subsequently
connected to the Russian Power grid. Thus, the power plants were of regional importance,
exporting electricity not just to Russia but to Latvia and Lithuania, too. Electricity production
peaked in 1980 (19,9 TWh) and has gradually been decreasing since then.93 In 1991, oil shale
accounted for 56.3% of Estonian primary energy demand and covered 98% of fuels for electricity
production (in 1996, but it is reasonable to say that the number did not differ more than a few
percent in 1990).94 Because Estonian production capacity was larger than domestic demand, 37%
of electricity was exported.95In Estonia, the oil shale power plants provided energy for a
relatively large industrial complex, consisting mainly of the chemical industry and textile
manufacturing. The oil shale industry employed a large number of people in North Eastern
Estonia. Many people were brought to Estonia to work for the complex from all around the
89
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Soviet Union. Narva and the other larger cities in the region like Jõhvi and Kohtla Järve, formerly
consisting mostly of Estonian- speaking population, were mostly Russian- speaking by the 1980s.
It is thus clear the oil shale industry was not just important for security of electricity and heat
supply, but because it employed a large number of people, it was also socially important. In 2000,
it accounted for 4% of Estonian GDP and employed more than 7500 people (12500 in 1991 96).97
After regaining independence, the oil shale power plants guaranteed Estonia self- sufficient
electricity supply at a moderate price.98
On the negative side, oil shale is a relatively inefficient energy source with a yield ranging from
11,5- 17%, depending on the production process.99 Electricity production also comes with a great
environmental cost. During the years under the Soviet regime, no attention was paid to
environmental protection.100 Power plants accounted for about 72% of all CO2 emissions (170,7
t) (in 1991), accounted for 82% of all water consumption in Estonia in 2000101, and for 72% of
waste (oil shale ash and semicoke) in the same year.102 Oils shale mining creates additional
problems as it has disturbed 8,4% of the area of the Ida- Viru County, deeming it unlivable in the
future. Mining is also accompanied by lowering of the water level and discharging of mine water
to the surface water (this was stopped in 2000).103 The oil shale mining and electricity production
both have a complicated impact on the surrounding landscapes, on their ecological state and
matter cycling. The external cost of electricity production has been calculated to be about 3
Eurocent/kWh (2007) whereas the average price of electricity in Estonia was 0.06 Eurocent/kWh
in 1991 and has gradually increased to 6 Eurocent/kWh today.104 Total environmental taxation, in
2008, was 5 Eurocent/kWh. It is thus easy to see that it is Estonia‟s largest polluter and if stricter
environmental standards would be imposed, electricity production would consequently have to
invest in cleaner and more environmentally friendly techniques.
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However, it has to be said that after Estonia regained independence, the restructuring of the
economy and economic relations resulted in significant decrease in industrial output: it was only
50,8% in 1994 compared to 1991.105 Electricity production in 1993 was only 60% of the 1991
levels and it has roughly stayed at that level to this day. Environmental harmfulness, percentagewise, has nevertheless stayed roughly at the same levels. Thus, a substantial change in
environmental policy could still have a possible impact on security of electricity supply.
Despite the environmental costs, oil shale mining and electricity production have continued. This
is because electricity, as discussed before, is a strategic commodity for the development of the
economy. The continuation of production is thus vital even though it has other negative effects.
In comparison, Estonia also boasts some of the largest deposit of phosphorite ore in all of Europe.
Even though its exploitation is economically lucrative, the environmental cost would be
enormous.106 The result would be possibly the pollution of some 40% of Estonia‟s water supply
and increased air pollution through ore processing at the mine. 107 The adoption of phosphorite
would also have required “another large influx of immigrant labor into Estonia, yet another
demographic threat to the native population.”108 The environmental question created an
unprecedented public debate in 1987, the so called “Phosphorite War”, leading to demonstrations
when Estonia was still under Soviet rule. It created a movement for change that arguably was one
of the reasons behind Estonia‟s eventual independence. Many of the top politicians of the early
1990 were a part of that movement. The oil shale industry, however, had already established
itself in Estonia, employing a large number of people and providing Estonia with self- sufficiency
with electricity. At the time, Estonia was a poor country with no domestic capital to invest in the
electricity sector. The people even struggled to pay for basic energy services like heat or
electricity. The economic situation and political instability initially excluded any foreign
investment. Thus, the politicians, even though holding environmental protection in high regard,
did not have an alternative for oil shale to consider in the early 1990s.
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4. Empirical findings and analysis: development of EU and Estonian
energy policies
4.1.

1991- 1995: Early stages of EU and Estonian energy policies

This section aims to give an overview of the early stages of EU and Estonian energy policies. I
first discuss developments on the EU- level with the aim to establish a framework against which
to compare developments in the Estonian domestic level. In the latter case, I first aim to explain
the nature of the politico- economic environment. Then, assuming that the EU did not have a
significant influence on Estonian energy policy, the goal is to compare general principles of longterm development of the electricity sector in EU and in Estonia. This will give us an idea of the
similarities and differences of the aforementioned policies in terms of the logic of
appropriateness. For in later stages, the EU had an increasing influence in terms of logic of
consequences/ incentives in Estonian domestic politics.
4.1.1.

EU energy policy

Even though one of the key reasons for European integration in the first place was the idea of
peaceful utilization of energy resources, the EU lacked a common energy policy for a long time.
We can start talking about reform in the electricity market from the formation of the European
single market in 1987, with the Single Europe Act, that required EU Member States to “remove
physical, fiscal and legal barriers to the free movement of goods, services, capital and labor
within the EU.109 “Of all the economic sectors enjoying some form of state- sanctioned
monopolistic protection, the energy sector, and specifically the electric energy sector, has been
the last one forced to liberalize.”110 The Single Europe Act provided a framework for reform in
the electricity market but did not lead to liberalization. A proposal was made by the European
Commission to impose an EU- wide carbon energy tax, but if failed due to opposition from the
Member States, who perceived state autonomy on taxing as a core value, and from industry
lobbies.111 As Frank Convery argues, because of unacceptability of taxation, this would
eventually lead to an emissions trading scheme.
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Some decisions, however, had already been made on environmental policy. Following the 1972
Stockholm United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, the EU adopted the 1973
First Community Action Programme on the Environment that outlined the Community‟s
environmental mandate. It included “the improvement of Community living standards to provide
clean air, pure water and food; access to nature as uncontaminated as possible; the elimination of
distortions in competition and technical barriers to trade due to differences between national
environmental legislation; the regulation of pollution that crosses national boundaries.” 112 A step
further was the 1984 Directive on combating air pollution from industrial plants (84/360/EEC),
but it only dealt more with distortions in competition and technical barriers to trade.113 Emissions
from industrial plants, believed to cause acid rains, were addressed four years later, in the 1988
Large Combustion Plants Directive (88/609/EEC), aiming to reduce sulphur dioxide, oxides of
nitrogen and dust emissions. Talks over the adoption and the content of the Directive went on for
five years because of opposition from Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Spain and the UK. 114
The EU environment policy thus did not have an easy beginning. The Member States‟ energy
sectors were considered national issues and the Commission had a difficult time increasing its
power in these sectors. A failed carbon tax and the lengthy negotiations over including energy in
the Single Europe Act framework show a strong opposition from the Member States. First steps,
however, had already been taken, i.e. with the industrial plants directive in 1984.
4.1.2.

Estonian energy policy

After regaining independence in 1991, Estonia started to transform its economy from a centrally
planned communist one to a capitalist market economy. The concept was to make the former
Soviet republic economically independent (so- called self- subsistence or autarkic).115 A plan for
the energy sector, suggestive by nature since it was written by scholars and was not an official
government document, “Eesti energeetika arengukava aastani 2005” (Estonian energy
development plan until 2005), had developed already in the late- 1980s, setting the principal
goals until 2005. Specifically, the main aims were to take the energy sector under government
control, transform energy companies into for- profit competitive organizations, create a national
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energy development plan, construct a gas- turbine power station to cover peak consumption,
support small energy companies for diversification purposes, not to renovate the old Balti Power
Plant, not to allow the construction of a new oil shale mine and an oil shale Viru Power Plant as it
was stated that the current production capacities would be sufficient until 2005- 2010.116 The
relevancy and correctness of these principles have been subsequently confirmed by state officials.
The first official guidelines were given by the document “Eesti energeetika arengu
üldpõhimõtted aastani 2003” (General principles in the development of Estonian energy until
2003), outlining three future development phases: 1) development of a legal basis and the
creation of economic relations, 2) increase in energy efficiency and the development of price and
tax policies, and 3) the integration and functioning of a regional energy complex.117
At first the government took all enterprises operating in the energy sector under its
administration, setting up state- owned companies starting from 15th January and 10th April
1991.118 The production associations “Eesti Põlevkivi” (Estonian Oil Shale) and “Eesti Energia”
(Estonian Energy) were turned into a state- owned consortium RAS Eesti Energia starting on 1
January 1993, along with the transmission system operator “OÜ Põhivõrk” and several
distribution network enterprises. The first restructuring processes occurred with the separation of
small district heating companies from the consortium by transferring ownership to the local
authorities.119
A privatization process of the state- owned companies started with the establishment of the stateowned company “Eesti Erastamisettevõte” (Estonian Privatization Company) in 1992 that would
coordinate the privatization process.120 Privatization in the electricity sector, however, would
only involve a few distribution network companies.
The Estonian government listed a number of companies, agencies and organizations that are vital
for the uninterrupted functioning of the country‟s economy in 1991. That list included the
production associations “Eesti Põlevkivi” and “Eesti Energia”. Thus, the government saw these
two organizations to be of foremost importance not just in ensuring the security of supply of
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electricity but for the development of the entire economy. The energy sector was regulated by the
Eesti Vabariigi Riiklik Energiaamet (Estonian State Energy Agency), created in 1991121 and
responsible for shaping Estonian energy policy, price formulation and the development of future
ownership structure, and market regulation for the energy sector.122 The agency, however, was
reorganized under the Ministry of Economic Affairs and ceased to exist as an autonomous
entity.123
Initial regulation over supply of primary energy resources, supply of electricity and
environmental protection for the next four years was formulated by the Republic of Estonia‟s
Supreme Council in 1992.124 It set the limits of oil shale mining and electricity generation as well
as emission goals to honor the 1979 Geneva Convention on long- range transboundary air
pollution by aiming to reduce SO2 emissions by 50% in 1995 compared to 1980 levels. This goal
appears extremely ambitious, but the numbers are deceiving. Because of the lack of attention to
environmental issues by the Soviet Union, SO2 emissions in Estonia in 1980 were 274800 tons
whereas the number had decreased to 179200 tons by 1992. As a result of the restructuring and
reorienting the Estonian economy after regaining independence, its size was rapidly shrinking.
Thus, reduction of SO2 emissions from 274800 tons to 110300 tons in 1995 was not as difficult
to achieve as it might appear.125 Additionally, oil shale mining and electricity production was to
decrease on average by 6.5% over the next four years. Another regulation was issued by the
Estonian Government to determine the price of oil shale and environmental taxes. The average
selling price of oil shale was to be 16.1 rubles per ton (the Estonian kroon was not yet introduced)
(which is app. 0.50 USD in 2010 value) and the mining company was to pay 8 million rubles of
environmental taxes (of which 3 million was emissions tax and 5 million natural resources tax)
(which is app. 0.0125 USD in 2010 value per ton).126 This was the price that buyers, i.e. the
electricity and chemical companies, had to pay Eesti Põlevkivi, but the mining company did not
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have to pay for the mining rights. After 1991, the prices would be regulated by the Estonian
Pricing Agency that was also to be responsible for the price of electricity.127
The electricity sector thus remained owned by the state and the most fundamental criteriaproduction volumes and prices- were centrally planned to meet the needs of an economy in
transition. For the time frame of 1991- 1995, no significant changes, i.e. direction towards a
market economy, were planned. A major change was environmental protection, aiming to
decrease emissions and to tax mining for environmental reasons. Compared to modern standards,
environmental issues were addressed only to a small degree. This is, however, understandable for
a newly independent country. Discussions in the parliament show that environmental issues were
of the least concern as it was uncertain how to provide essential services and commodities, like
heat and electricity, to the people who were often unable to pay for them. Thus a market economy
in the energy sector was, at the time, out of the question.
As we can see, the EU‟s and Estonian energy policies were incomparable in this period. Estonia
was implementing shock- economics in the early 1990s and underwent a massive economic
transformation that decreased industrial output by 40% over four years. The first priority was to
stabilize the economy and environmental protection as well as investments to the power
generation and distribution infrastructure was out of the question due to the lack of resources.
However, principles like market economy and greater environmental protection were prioritized.
The unofficial development plan, written by scholars, can even be interpreted as radical
compared to EU policies. The reality of the Estonian economy, however, greatly limited Estonian
ambitions. Fundamental economic transformation requires political and economic stability as a
precondition and Estonia needed more time to implement the changes to a greater degree.
Hence, there was a misfit due to historical legacies, deeming hypothesis 2 (historical legacies
influence domestic politics) correct. Of course, other factors have had an influence on the
situation, too. They will be discussed in the coming chapters.

4.2.

1995- 2004: Estonia as an EU candidate state

In this period, the main focus of research is on the mechanisms of Europeanization during
Estonia‟s status as a candidate state. First, a brief overview of the beginning of the accession
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negotiation process is given. Then, I will give an overview of developments in EU energy policy
that essentially also constitutes the energy acquis. Compared to the earlier period, adoption of EU
legislation was now a precondition to accession. In this context, I will aim to evaluate the EU‟s
use of conditionality. In particular, how much room for interpretation was left for Estonia to
implement change?
4.2.1.

Estonia and the EU

The first steps towards European Union membership by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were taken
12th June 1995 when the three states signed association treaties with the EU (European Treaty),
six months after Austria, Finland and Sweden became EU members. An official application for
accession was presented to the EU on 28th of November the same year. The European Council
decided to start official accession talks on 13th of December 1997 at the Luxembourg European
Council. The two other Baltic States were not initially part of this decision showing that Estonia
had been more successful in adopting different criteria for accession.128
The European Treaty aimed to liberalize trade between the EU and Estonia and called for greater
scientific, educational, cultural and environmental cooperation.129 The accession talks, however,
required Estonia to adopt EU principles that in practice meant a great change in legislation. This
process had in fact started before than the actual talks began for it was well known that Estonia
had to make major changes to its legislature to meet the membership criteria formulated at the
1993 Copenhagen European Council.
4.2.2.

EU energy policy

The EU agreed to liberalize its electricity markets in 1996, after eight years of controversial
negotiations.130 The European electricity markets had typically been dominated by regional or
national monopolies. Several attempts to establish a supranational energy policy had failed
because “member states have been keen to retain tight control over a sector that they consider to
be of strategic political and economic importance.”131 In Europe, this situation started to change
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in the early 1990s when United Kingdom and the Nordic Countries started to first adopt
comprehensive electricity market reforms, influenced by a spillover effect from global
privatization and liberalization, as Burkard Eberlein explains.132 A second development was
connected the incremental incorporation of the energy sector to the single market agenda by the
European Commission. The process was slow due to Member States‟ opposition and the
Commission “opted for the negotiated decision route by the Council legislation.”133
A framework for EU energy policy was established by the 1995 Green Paper (94/659/EC) on
energy policy, emphasizing the interrelation of three goals: environmental sustainability, security
of supply and establishment of an internal market for energy.
The debates resulted in the First Electricity Directive in 1996 (96/92/EC). It “distinguishes the
regulated segments of the industry (transmission and networks infrastructure) from the
competitive segments (generation and supply or retail).” This distinction was to be the basis of
the “gradual opening of the electricity market, establishing different rules concerning nondiscriminatory access to the transmission and system network, leaving it to the Member States to
choose between third Party access (regulated or negotiated) and the single buyer model.” It also
“established requirements for settlement of national disputes indicating two options for the
construction of new generation plants (by tender and authorization)” and “required the
unbundling of the transmission system operators (TSOs), and the separation in accounting of
transmission and distribution from other market actors.”134
According to Pierre Bauby and Frédéric Varone, the Directive was the result of an
intergovernmental compromise between France and Germany.135 They say that “it was directly
negotiated between French President Chirac and German Chancellor Kohl, who were at odds
over the degree of openness needed for electricity markets.” 136 To increase the degree of
competitiveness of German industry, Kohl, supported by the German industry lobby, wanted
rapid and broad liberalization. The French, on the other hand, were satisfied with the current
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situation and wanted to maintain limited liberalization. The French industry also wanted to “keep
its advantages in regard to its technological expertise and its nuclear industry, as well as to be
able to continue to support a policy of regional solidarity.”137 The German position, however,
received more support in the EU, “and the French government agreed to start opening its market
in hope of profiting from EDF‟s competitiveness which resulted from the French nuclear
programme.”138 Thus, the Directive can be seen as driven by between French and German
national objectives, rather than being concerned with promoting European objectives.139
This framework did not achieve expected results as “the negotiated Third Party access, the
limited effect by accounting unbundling, duty and the lack of obligation to create national
electricity regulators did not foster the achievement of competitive markets.”140 Andres Pointvogl
agrees with this saying that a move towards a single market was problematical because of reasons
like “shortcomings in Member States‟ implementation, discriminatory market access or the
dominance of incumbents.”141 Eberlein sees in the whole process an unlikely outcome because of
skeptical governments and the incumbent utilities being stronger than the pro- liberalization
coalition of consumers and potential competitors.142 He also shows that the literature has given
different explanations regarding theoutcome to this puzzle.
Security of supply issues were primarily tackled in the Directive 98/93/EC, regulating a
minimum security stock of oil and petroleum products.
The environmental dimension was addressed by the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control
Directive (96/61/EC). Its main goal is to limit pollution to the level of best available techniques
by regulating emissions in air, water and land by permits. The Directive has since been replaced
by the Directive 2008/1/EC that mainly just simplifies the legislation and introduces linguistic
changes but does not substantially change the original Directive. A key decision that aimed to
reduce greenhouse gases was made in June 1998, when the Member States agreed to a national
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target to reduce emissions by 8% compared to Kyoto targets of 1990. 143 These goals were
subsequently made legally binding.144 As Frank Convery argues, this decision was important in
enabling the emergence of the Emissions Trading Scheme.145
The environmental sustainability dimension was further strengthened by the Directive
2001/77/EC, requiring Member States to “increase the share of green energy sources in the
production of electricity to 22% by 2010. It also requires Member States to promote investments
in green power generation.”146 A slightly different approach was taken by the Large Combustion
Plants Directive that was amended in 2001 (2001/80/EC). It aims to reduce emissions of
acidifying pollutants, particles and ozone precursors (particularly SO2, NOx and dust) from large
combustion plants of rated thermal input of equal or greater than 50MW for it is needed to
combat acidification, eutrophication and ground- level ozone as part of the overall strategy to
reduce air pollution. 147
Because of the limited success of the First Electricity Directive, the Commission put forward new
legislative proposals in 2001. A favorable political context allowed the Florence Forum 148 to
arrive to an agreement resulting in the 2003 Second Electricity Directive (2003/54/EC) and the
Regulation 2004/1223/EC. Fabio Domanico explains that the Directive has four main objectives:
“First, it guarantees better non- discriminatory access to the network, eliminating the possibility
of negotiated third party access and allowing only the regulated TPA, assuring all market
operators more rights to access the network. Second, it assures a more effective legal separation
between market actors and the operators working in the transmission and distribution sectors,
with the aim of limiting the risk of cross subsidization and discrimination between incumbents
and new entrants. Third, it establishes the obligation for Member States to create an effective
regulator with a major degree of independence from market operators but not from national
governments. Fourth, theDirective provides a timetable for the different market opening stages,
giving consumers freedom of choice over suppliers. [The deadlines for opening stages are] 1st
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July 2004 for non- domestic users (industrial, commercial and professional consumers) and 1st
July for all consumers.”149 The Regulation oversees the “harmonized principles for tariff and
payments between TSOs,”…“rules and compulsory guidelines regarding the management of
network congestion and the allocation of cross- border capacity” and “provides rules about
incentives for private investments in the network.”150
The common rules, however, still allowed “considerable scope for diversity in implementation by
member states,” for full harmonization, delegation of formal regulatory powers to the
Commission or the establishment of an independent EU energy regulator was politically not an
option.151 Failure to establish a pan- European regulator has been seen as the greatest weakness of
the second set of energy directives.”152
The second energy package was followed by legislation emphasizing environmental
sustainability. European emissions trading, separate from the Kyoto emissions trading, was first
introduced by the Directive 2003/87/EC, that resulted in the European Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Trading Scheme (started 1st January 2005), allowing the more efficient producers in
terms of greenhouse gas emissions to “sell their excess allowances to other more polluting ones,”
thus providing incentives to increase competitiveness by investing into more environmentally
efficient methods of production.153 The goal is thus to reduce industrial greenhouse gas emissions
in a cost- effective way. The Directive 2004/8/EC regarding the promotion of cogeneration is
another example of prioritizing more sustainable power generation by allowing advantages in
network access.154
Security of supply measures are were mainly regulated by the Directive 2005/89/EC, that
requires the transmission system operators to guarantee an adequate level of generation capacity
by maintaining reserve capacity and interconnectedness to other Member States‟ transmission
networks, maintaining balance of supply and demand by the establishment of wholesale markets
and by ensuring network investment by the companies in order to meet foreseeable demand for
the market.
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This shows us that the EU‟s energy policy had made some progress, but its implementation in
Member States did not achieve the level that was hoped for. The trinity of security of supply,
creation of an internal market and environmental sustainability had all been addressed but the
legislation still allowed some wiggle room. Generally, security of supply had already been a
priority for the Member States, but it was the latter two of the Commission‟s policy directions
that faced some opposition. Emissions reductions were limited mainly to large industrial plants,
but decisions on the Emissions Trading Scheme had been already made. In regards to the internal
market, the main deficiencies in implementation were equal market access, unbundling of
different electricity production and distribution related activities and connections between
Member States. A general framework was nevertheless in place that both indicated the greatest
problems and allowed for improvement.
4.2.3.

Estonian energy policy

The Estonian association treaty with the EU started a wave of legislative reforms to update
regulation in accordance with EU legislation. The first major step in terms of the energy sector
regulation was the adoption of the Energy Act (Energiaseadus). Its first draft had already been
made in 1992, but it did not make it into Riigikogu (the Parliament) for reading. The Ministry of
Economic Affairs had, however, been working on improving it, involving domestic, EU and
other international specialists, scientists and practitioners in the process. It seems, though, that the
association treaty created a sense of urgency, along with the developments in the EU legislation
in 1996.
It was recognized that the state of the Estonian energy sector was typical for a transforming
country that was not up to the modern quality, safety and technical standards. The principal goal
was to reorganize the energy sector, creating a framework for the implementation of safety,
quality and environmental requirements.155 The Act aimed to create an energy market that would
have price formation according to the balance between supply and demand, while ensuring the
equal treatment of consumers in a monopolistic market and creating of a regulatory agency that
would oversee the technical and price formation aspects of the market. It also created a
foundation for the privatization of the power generation facilities.
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The Act was adopted in accordance of the developments in EU legislation, but it was based on
the strategic principles stated in the Estonian Government‟s Fuel- and energy economy long term
development plan (FEEDP), adopted in 1997, and was influenced by the 1994 Energy Charter
that Estonia was to ratify after the adoption of the Energy Act. The FEEDP is of particular
interest as it states the main policy goals in terms of energy. The document clearly states that
energy policy is part of a grander plan to join the EU. Thus, the aim of Estonian energy policy, in
part, must be in compatibility with the goals and legislation of EU energy policy.
The EU regarded the most important instruments in harmonizing Member States‟ and other
European states‟ energy policies to be the liberalization of the market, price transparency of the
price, efficiency in energy production and consumption, and the development of transnational
energy networks.156 The Estonian specific energy policy goals were to be consistent with this
framework. The main aims could be summarized as ensuring political and economic
independence through security of supply in order to ensure economic growth required to join the
EU; optimal prices, environmental protection, sustainable development and energy efficiency,
and meeting the requirements for successful accession to the EU. The electricity specific goals
were to increase the reliability of the electricity system, increasing the quality of electricity, and
the optimal functioning and development of the electricity system. These goals were to be
achieved through implementing market economy principles in the system of management and
creating a system control center, and changing the frequency of the system to be compatible with
the Western European ones as well as preparing the construction of an underwater electricity
cable between Finland and Estonia.
The Energy Act had three main consequences, additional to the legal regulation regime. First, it
established two regulatory agencies, Energiaturu Inspektsioon (Estonian Energy Market
Inspectorate)157 and Tehnilise Järelvalve Inspektsioon (Estonian Technical Surveillance
Authority)158 in 1998. Both agencies were to be under the administration of the Ministry of
Economic Affairs. The first was to be responsible the ensuring competition in the energy market
(this was added in 2003), issuing operation permits, regulating the price of electricity and
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overseeing the market by the power vested in it by the law. The latter was primarily to conduct
surveillance in technical fields.
Second, the Act allowed the restructuring of the oil shale complex. According to the Government
Regulation No. 1277 (RT I 1999, 1, 23, 29.12. 1998), RE Eesti Energia was to be transformed
into a holding company that owned the stocks of the Eesti and Balti Power Plants as well as the
stocks of Eesti Põlevkivi, the oils- shale mining company, and OÜ Põhivõrk, the transmission
system operator. The restructuring was reviewed by the National Audit Office of Estonia, which
saw no contradiction in Estonian laws, or decisions previously made by Riigikogu or the
Government.159
Third, the restructuring created a heated debate over the privatization of the state- owned AS
Eesti Energia that went on for six years. Privatization, part of the transition to a market economy
in electricity production, was also seen to give foreign banks additional guarantees for loans
needed to invest in renovating old and building new production facilities. The company was and
still is of strategic importance politically and economically to Estonia. It is also Estonia‟s largest
employer and is especially important in the northeastern mining and industrial region. Thus the
privatization of the company was political in motivation.
A privatization plan was confirmed by the Estonian Government in December 1997. The stateowned company RAS Eesti Energia was to be divided into different independently- run
companies but still owned by the state. Most of the companies were to be established in 1998,
including transmission system operators, technical support, and heat and electricity producers.160
Some structural changes were done already in 1996, when two heat plants and two construction
support functions were separated from Eesti Energia. The primary goal for this process was to
make the companies eligible for privatization. Eesti Energia, with its subsidiaries became an
independently- run company in 1998. Smaller restructuring and privatization continued inside the
company over the next two years.161
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The center of the debate was not privatization itself, but how it was done. An American company,
NRG, showed interest in creating a joint company with the Estonian government in 1996. In
March 1996, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed in Washington by the two
sides that would set a framework and a timetable for the negotiations even though three other
companies were interested in participating in the privatization process. The general idea was to
partly privatize Eesti Energia (the State would hold 51% of the shares after the deal) and the
foreign investor would then invest (what would‟ve been the largest foreign direct investment to
Estonia then) in the new company. The first key step was to develop a business plan by July
1997. By that time, however, Estonia had already experienced a few unsuccessful privatization
experiences that would serve as warning examples.162 It created skepticism in public opinion and
put the Estonian politicians under pressure. The process was criticized by the Estonian press for
lack of transparency and for not offering a public access to the privatization.

163

Although the

Government had signed an Oil Shale Restructuring Plan 2001- 2006 that established the
privatization process, in practice, it was the MoU that essentially set the direction of the future of
Estonian electricity production. This process received loud criticism from the environmentalists‟
camp who accused the Government of unconstitutional action because the Ministry of Economic
Affairs and Communications that had developed the restructuring plan had not evaluated the
environmental impact of the restructuring. However, environmental concern was only a part of
the issue. The government was accused of keeping electricity prices artificially low while
ignoring the environmental costs and giving Eesti Energia a monopolistic position in the market
by guaranteeing it favorable conditions while not doing enough to create electricity connections
to EU Member States. Although Estonia had been able to meet emissions criteria under the Kyoto
protocol, it was not because of increased efficiency but because of the decline of industrial output
after regaining independence. Thus, the 1990 emission levels were relatively easy to meet as the
economy had shrunk by 40% by 1995, as noted before. The environmentalists pointed out that
although international agreements were honored, Estonia was still one of the larger polluters in
the world. Thus, the cynical treatment of the Kyoto criteria was not ethical.164
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This discussion was in response to the Prime Minister Mart Laar‟s earlier presentation in the
Riigikogu on 23 August 2001. He had assured that the negotiations with NRG were going as
planned and it was in accordance with desirable developments. It appears that the wide criticism
had had at least some effect as Laar announced that the Estonian government would withdraw
from selling the minority shares of Eesti Energia, scheduled for 8 January 2002. He stated that
the main reason was the improved economic situation of Estonia where the company would be
able to invest and modernize the plants by itself.165 Another reason was that the American
company could not present guarantees for a loan meant to finance the investments agreed upon in
the MoU as it was expecting a guarantee from the Estonian state that it did not receive.
According to one Estonian official, the decision was entirely political as the actual decision
would have had to be made by the next government, something that the sitting government would
have not tolerated.166
The failure to incorporate foreign investment to Eesti Energia did not inhibit development.
Modernizing the power plants had, to an extent, already started in 1995, in the form of renovation
of turbines, repairing of boilers, installation of new electrostatic precipitators and demolition of
old combustion boilers.167 The installation of two CFB boilers168 had in fact started the same day
in 2001 when Prime Minister Laar announced the deal with NRG was off.169
From the environmental point of view, the Energy Act was meant to be in accordance of the
framework set by the 1995 Sustainable Development Act (Säästva Arengu Seadus, RT 1995, 31,
384). It was, in turn, based on the decisions of the UN Environment- and Development
Conference (Rio de Janeiro, 1992). Electricity production was also affected by the Pollution Fee
Act (Saastetasu Seadus, RT I 1999, 24, 361) that set fees for emissions to the air, land and water.
Polluters in Narva, among other regions, had to pays of fee 20- 50% higher than the normal rates
(§8, 2.1. and 2.2). The fees were initially relatively low, but were to rise remarkably over the next
few years: CO2 from 46 kroon in 1999 to 137 in 2005 with similar growth rates on other
emissions as well.
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Security of supply was addressed by delegating the obligation to ensure adequate supply to the
transmission system operator by the Energy Act. At the time, Estonia was exporting electricity
and additional measures were not seen as necessary. One of the main goals, however, was the
establishment, as required by the EU, of strategic fuels reserves. 170 Another action was the
signing of the contract between Estonian, Finnish, Norwegian and US companies on 9 October
2001to build a 315MW power cable between Estonia and Finland.171 The cable was to start
operation in 2004. It would then be the only power connection between the Baltic States and the
EU.
In July 1997, the Commission expressed the view that Estonia did not face major difficulties “in
approximating the energy related acquis in the medium term, provided that its current efforts
were intensified.”172 Areas of specific importance were “the adjustment of monopolies including
import and export issues, access to the network, energy pricing, State interventions, the
restructuring of the oil- shale sector, emergency preparedness including building up mandatory
oil stocks, energy efficiency and environmental norms.”173 Some of these issues were addressed
in either the Energy Act or other legislation. In fact, the Energy Act, as mentioned before, was
formulated with the help of EU specialists and thus developed under EU supervision. A legal
framework was thus in place, but further action was required, like adjustment of monopolies,
access to networks, energy pricing, etc. Some of these deficiencies, like pricing and adjustment of
monopolies, according to the Energy Act adoption discussion in the Parliament, were to be
eliminated by 2000. The Commission‟s November 1998 and October 1999 Reports take notice of
these deficiencies saying that “further efforts would be needed if Estonia were to participate in
the internal energy market.”174 The November 2000 Report noted progress in restructuring of the
oil sector, particularly by the selling of 49% of the shares of Eesti Energia to a strategic investor.
As we know, this would not actually happen. The Report also noted that “considerable progress
[was] still [to] be made in many areas, including security of supply, energy efficiency, etc., in
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order to fully comply with the acquis in this field.”175 The November 2001 Progress Report
confirmed progress, notably in areas like adopting legislature and improving security of supply. It
also pointed out the adoption of the Oil Shale Sector Restructuring Plan and gave an overview of
the plan. However, further guarantees of its implementation were required. The Report also
pointed out the labor intensive nature of the oil shale sector and “due to the tense socio- economic
situation of the region [North- East Estonia] any reductions in the number of employees must be
dealt with great responsibility.”176 The October 2002 Progress Report confirmed further progress
towards harmonization with the acquis, particularly in terms of abolishing price distortions and
opening up the gas market. It also reported on a major change in the Energy Act. It would be
separated into sector- specific laws making regulation more precise and detailed. The electricity
sector would then be regulated by the Electricity Market Act. 177 The final Report was issued in
2003 saying that “Estonia was essentially meeting the commitments and requirements arising
from the accession negotiations in the energy sector and was expected to be in position to
implement the acquis by accession.”178 However, opening of the electricity market would not be
done according to the requirements of EU directives but according to a schedule agreed during
the negotiations.179
Before accession to the EU, Estonia still had to revise legislature regarding the electricity market,
as was pointed out in the 2003 Estonian Progress Report to the Commission. The basic idea was
to separate gas and electricity market regulation into two different, more precise and specific
pieces of legislature. Liina Tõnisson, the Minister of Economic Affairs, Roads and
Communications, justified the need for this change due to the quick development of the
electricity markets. The Electricity Market Act proposal was in accordance with the Energy Act
but had to take into account more recent developments, namely the adoption of the Directive on
the Electricity Internal Market on the EU level.180 The main changes in the Electricity Market Act
175
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compared to the Energy Act, were the additions of both nuclear and renewable energy- specific
regulation. A nuclear power plant could only be constructed upon the approval of Riigikogu (§22,
6). Regarding renewables, the main change was the obligation for the TSO to buy any electricity
that is produced from renewable energy sources. This, however, concerns only a fraction of the
electricity market as only 0.29% of all electricity in 2000 was produced from renewable sources.
By 2006, the number had risen to 1.47% and the share of combined production from 0 to
10.7%.181 Oil shale still accounted for over 90% of all electricity production. It is also worth
pointing out that the readings over the Energy Market Act proposal did not generate much
discussion in the Riigikogu. During the three readings, only four questions were asked from the
presenters. In comparison, during the Energy Act, at least ten questions were asked in every
reading. It thus appears that the adoption of the Electricity Market Act was merely a formal
procedure to fulfill requirements coming from EU directives and regulations.
As we can see, significant developments occurred in both the EU and Estonian levels during this
period. Estonian energy policy generally followed the EU‟s lead, by adopting principles that were
previously codified in the EU. Estonia was lagging behind in its energy policy and electricity
market regulation. The major legislative changes were both required and advised by EU
specialists. Both the Energy and Electricity Market Acts did take into account the situation in
Estonia and the legislation was modified accordingly. In specific policy directions, energy
security had already been ensured by the oil shale complex, but it wasn‟t until January 2002 when
the implementation principle of best available techniques was started by renovating the 8th energy
bloc in the Eesti Power Plant.182 In terms of creating an internal energy market, actions were
taken to harmonize the Estonian legislation according to EU requirements. Estlink 1, the power
cable between Estonia and Finland would, however, be the only connection that the Baltic States
would have with other EU Member States, although it was not built not as a part of an EU policy.
If effect, an internal market in the Baltic States would, at the time, only be possible between the
three states. Access to the market was still denied for third party- states, with a transition period
negotiated until 2013. Changes in the environmental sustainability dimension were also rather
cosmetic, with no serious action to reduce emissions from the Narva Power Plants.
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Support for electricity production from renewable resources was indeed granted, but the
quantities were marginal without having any influence on the larger picture. Combined
production can however be regarded as an exception in this context. The Estonian Government
prioritized affordable and continuous electricity supply that would allow the Estonian economy to
develop to a level required to join the EU. Thus, Estonia was still a transition country that, in
principle, shared the same values as the EU, but the relative backwardness of the economy and
historical legacies in the form of Soviet electricity infrastructure did not allow full adoption of the
policies. Hence, hypothesis 4 is correct, as it can be argued that Europeanization has occurred
because Estonia has been motivated by internalized identities, values and norms, and thus
legitimacy of rules, appropriateness of behavior, persuasion and complex learning characterize
the process of rule transfer and rule adoption in the Estonian electricity sector.
Because the Commission did not require full harmonization of the policies during Estonia‟s status
as a candidate state, by allowing long transition periods, hypothesis 3 (Europeanization has
occurred because of EU-s superior bargaining position that has led to an ability to threaten with
noncooperation and thereby force to make Estonia concessions) is incorrect. It must also be
recognized that restructuring an old and substandard electricity sector to modern levels may not
even be possible in six to seven years. Concessions in demands are thus understandable.
Because of the historical legacy of the oil shale complex, the status of hypothesis 5 remains
vague. Estonia had induced reforms that were similar to the European ones because they were
seen as effective remedies of inherently domestic needs and policy challenges, but the process
had started before accession talks with the EU began. It is thus not appropriate to call this process
Europeanization. Rather, the background of the change is more profound, having global
characteristics. It is also important to note that not all EU rules were recognized as effective
remedies even by the Commission. Hence, the formulation of hypothesis 5 is not appropriate, at
least in the short- term, to explain change in the case of the Estonian electricity sector.
The negotiated transition periods also mean that, in principal, the accession process continues
even after Estonia joined the EU. But by granting membership to Estonia, EU agreed to give
away a large part of its bargaining power (membership as the greatest incentive). After accession,
Estonia was also able to participate in the decision making process and, at least in principle, has
the opportunity to influence EU- wide policies.
46

4.3.

2004- 2011: Estonia as a new EU Member State

In this period, the main focus of my research is to evaluate the success of Europeanization in the
Estonian electricity sector. As in earlier periods, I will first give an overview of developments in
EU energy policy to establish a framework in which to compare the Estonian policies. A more
specific focus is on the conditions that either support or limit the process of Europeanization.
4.3.1. EU energy policy
The most important document concerning EU energy policy to date is the 2006 Commission of
the European Communities Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable Competitive and
Secure Energy. It stated six priority areas: completing the internal European electricity and gas
markets, an internal market that guarantees security of supply through solidarity between
Member States, tackling security and competitiveness through a more sustainable, efficient and
diverse energy mix, tackling climate change through an integrated approach, encouraging
innovation through a strategic European energy technology plan, and aiming towards a more
coherent external energy policy.183 Compared to the earlier policy directions, the 2006 Green
Paper provides a more diverse framework by adding an integrated approach to tackle climate
change and a coherent external energy policy to the agenda.
As a consequence of the Green Paper, a third energy and climate package of legislation was
proposed by the Commission in January 2007 under the label an „Energy Policy for Europe‟. 184 It
was published in the Official Journal of European Union in August 2009 (electricity related were
the Regulations 2009/713/EC and 2009/714/EC as well as Directive 2009/72/EC). The main aims
are to establish an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators and to “better functioning of
market access and competition by ownership unbundling or introducing independent system
operators185, for increasing regulators‟ capacities and for more transparency, aiming to draw the
European model of energy market liberalization closer to the standard textbook model
(Pointvogl‟s emphasis).”186 The package entered into force in September 2009, requiring
implementation of the requirements by March 2011 and ownership unbundling by March 2012.
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Recognizing its leading role in international climate protection, the EU aimed to further reduce its
emissions at the Council of the European Union‟s Spring Summit in March 2007.

187

Earlier

European climate policy had been based in the United Nations Framework on Climate Change,
and its Kyoto protocol that only run until 2012. To continue efforts of fighting global warming,
the Member States‟ governments set the so- called 20-20-20 targets as a part of the third climate
and energy package. The final legal texts were adopted by the EU‟s Council of Ministers in April
2009.188 Specifically, the goal was to achieve a 20% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by
2020 compared to 1990 and an increase the share of renewable energy sources to 20% by the
same year in the energy mix. It was also decided that the share of biofuels should rise to 10% of
overall fuel consumption. The third 20 goal- reduction in primary energy use compared to
projected levels, to be achieved by improving energy efficiency, was established in an energy
efficiency communication from the Commission in 2008.189
The package also revised the European Greenhouse Gas Trading Scheme that was originally
divided into two phases. In the pilot phase (2005- 2007) the Member States could allocate 95% of
the emissions to the polluting installations for free and for the second phase, 90% of the
allowances would be free.190 In essence, the first period was to measure and verify emissions and
to accumulate experience for further action. The idea is to gradually reduce allowances so that
total emissions fall. The EU ETS works on the “cap and trade” principle. At the end of each year
each company that falls under the criteria to be participating in the ETS must surrender enough
allowances to cover all its emissions, or heavy fines are imposed. If a company is successful in
reducing its emissions, it can sell the allowances to another company or keep them for future
considerations.191 The key change in the second phase is reduction of emission allowances, but
the basic principles are still the same. For the second phase, each Member State could propose
national allowances, but it was for the Commission to decide the eventual cap allowed.192 The
Directive 2003/87/EC was amended by the Directive 2009/29/EC (part of the third energy187
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climate package) for the purpose of implementing a reduction commitment to meet the 20%
overall reduction in greenhouse gas emissions for the third phase (2013- 2020). It also lays down
provisions to assess and implement a 30% reduction if other developed countries agree to honor
the Kyoto protocol. An annual allocation quantity of allowances is to be decreased by a linear
factor of 1.74%. The greatest change for the third period is setting of an overall EU cap, with
allowances then allocated to Member States and a move from allowances to auctioning (Article
10).
From the Estonian perspective, security of supply was most notably addressed by prioritizing an
interconnection plan. The Commission subsequently launched the Baltic Energy Market
Interconnection Plan (BEMIP) in the 2008 autumn European Council, with the goal of fully
integrating the Baltic States into the European energy market and to strengthen interconnections
with their EU neighboring countries.193 Specifically, the plan emphasizes interconnections
between Estonia and Finland, Latvia and Sweden as well as Lithuania and Poland. So far, as
noted above, it has resulted in beginning of construction of the Estlink 2 underwater power cable.
4.3.2.

Estonian energy policy

By the time of the June 2001 Göteborg European Council meeting, Estonia had been able to
provisionally close two- thirds of the negotiating chapters and it was decided that, among other
states, it would be ready to join the EU in 2004. In the following years after joining the EU, no
significant progress in Estonian energy policy can be observed, with the exception of minor
amendments to existing legislation. In November 2005, the Estonian Government evaluated
further changes that needed to be made to fully harmonize Estonian legislation with EU
Directives.194 The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications still had to still adopt eight
Directives, of which three were related to the electricity market or electricity production. In
particular, the Electricity Market Act had to be amended in two parts and the third change was
related to air protection.
It wasn‟t until 2008 when the Government adopted comprehensive energy- specific action plans.
Estonia was facing substantial changes in the near future as the deadlines for market opening and
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implementing stricter environmental standards on electricity production were approaching. The
most general guidelines for future action were envisaged in the Estonian National Energy
Economy Development Plan until 2020 (ENEEDP) that set a general framework for the entire
energy sector.195 Broadly, the need for adaptation of the Estonian electricity sector was
influenced by global trends such as the “rise of global fuel prices, gradual liberalization of energy
markets, start of the European Emissions Trading Scheme, deepening of energy supply problems,
rise of energy security issues and developments in renewable energy.” 196 Furthermore,
developments on the EU level such as the aim to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, increase of
the share of renewable energy sources in energy consumption and efforts to decrease overall
energy consumption required Estonia to honor the obligations it had taken with becoming an EU
Member State.197 The development plan aims to ensure continuous, effective and sustainable
energy supply at a reasonable price.198 These goals are to be achieved through diversification of
the energy mix with connections to other Member States while maintaining a reliable
transmission network; by increasing energy efficiency, through use of renewable energy sources
and trough developing more environmentally friendly fossil fuels technologies; and by
developing regulation that avoids price distortions and market position abuse. 199 Additional
sector- specific guidelines are specified in the respective development plans.
The Electricity Economy Development Plan 2008- 2018 reviews previous actions and sets new
goals for the next policy period. It reports that the previous goals had been successfully achieved.
In relation to the Narva Power Plants, two combustion boilers, using the new fluidized bed
technology, had been installed in 2005. This investment, by far the largest in the Estonian energy
sector since 1991, allowed significant reductions in fuel and water usage. It also reduced the
amount of waste created in the combustion process and increased the boilers‟ energy
efficiency.200 Strategic choices in the electricity sector were listed as follows: the need to
decrease environmental cost of electricity production, obligations to decrease CO2 emissions in
2012 and 2016, need for more efficient use of oil shale resources, and the need to increase
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competitiveness of the Estonian electricity price due to the impact of emissions trading. 201
Although after 2015 no energy source is to exceed a share of 50% in the Estonian energy mix,
electricity produced from oil shale is still prioritized. Additionally, it has to be pointed out that
the drastic decrease of electricity produced from oil shale is occurring because of higher
environmental and technical standards required by the EU. Interestingly, the document does not
discuss a situation where Estonia would not be able to cover its electricity demand by domestic
production. As a study by Elering, the Estonian transmission system operator, reveals, Estonian
electricity production will in 2016 decrease to the level where domestic supply is unable to cover
approximately 20- 25% the peak consumption.202 By 2025, if no additional generation
capabilities will be built, the number will probably increase to almost 80%. It remains unclear
how the mission of the Estonian electricity sector- “to ensure the Estonian population with a
continuous, sustainable energy supply with a reasonable price”- will be achieved if new
production capacities will not be built. The measures to achieve continuous supply seem almost
autarkic, with the exception of prioritizing of building a new interconnection with other states
(Estlink 2). To support construction of new production capacities, government aid is seen as
needed because “new power plants have never been built on open markets.”203 It, however, does
not propose creating more a favorable investment environment or using foreign policy tools, such
as signing binding agreements with other states, to ensure security of supply in a context of an
open electricity market. These are the questions on which Estonian politicians should be
concentrating.204 The scope of the development plan is thus too narrow to take into account the
reality of the Estonian electricity sector.
The Estonian National Oil Shale Usage Development Plan lists a large number of problems
related to the sector, almost thirty pages overall. Estonian interest in regards to the sector is,
however, to ensure “continuous supply of electricity and heating to the consumers with valued
oils shale products while implementing best available techniques in mining and processing, using
oils shale and its collateral natural resources effectively and with a minimum environmental and
social cost in a way that ensures preservation of oils shale resources, security and the sustainable
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development of the State.”205 In order to achieve these goals, more effective, optimal and
sustainable oils shale mining, processing and usage is prioritized as well as decreasing the social
effects of activities and increasing research and development. Thus, oil shale is continuously seen
as an essential part of the Estonian energy economy and electricity production.
Goals in terms of environmental sustainability have been set in the Estonian Environmental
Strategy until 2030. In relation to energy production, the document sees the main problems in
pollution concentration, great losses in electricity transmission, vulnerability of the electricity
system in crisis- situations and in depressing of development of renewable resources. 206 Since the
goal of electricity production is to provide for Estonian consumption needs and to produce
enough to be able to export electricity, no large reductions in emissions are foreseen.
Diversifying energy sources and developing technologies with lesser environmental costs are
aspired to, but by 2015 no reductions of absolute levels of greenhouse gas emissions are planned
compared to 2005 levels. Diversification of the energy mix both in energy and electricity
production is comparatively insubstantial as the share of oil shale is meant to be decreased by 10
percentage points, from 90% to 80%.207 Thus, the degree of environmental sustainability is
dictated by the policy of security of supply. Substantially greater pollution reduction while
ensuring security of supply would require restructuring the entire Estonian electricity sector.
Interestingly, when pointing out the biggest problems to the health and life quality of the people,
the document does not discuss the historical legacy of the oil shale industrial complex. Instead,
the biggest problem is the legacy of the more recent past- “active economic activity that has been
primarily concentrated on high profitability and the peoples‟ aspirations to achieve a living
standard that is as high as possible.”208
Specific goals to increase environmental sustainability are described in the Environmental Action
Plan 2007- 2013.209 In relation to energy, the main goals are to approve energy- related and
environmental strategies, discussed above, in order to support and increase research and
development as well as to increase the share of renewable energy sources in energy production
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and to renovate and build new capacities in existing oil shale power plants. In order to meet EU
requirements (particularly the LCP and NEC Directives), the highest priority of action is given to
the renovation of the Iru, Ahtme and Narva Power Plants in order to meet environmental
requirements, as well as to build two new energy blocs to the Narva Power Plants. 210 The
decision to continue using oil shale as a fuel for electricity production has received criticism from
the EU. Even though the new generation capacity is more efficient due to using improved
technologies, it still generates high levels of emissions compared to most other methods. In one
opinion, Estonia is planning pollution as oil shale is seen as a “dirty fuel” and the decision to
build new capacities using oils shale as primary energy is undermining the EU‟s climate goals.211
From the Commission‟s standpoint, the problematic aspect in this issue is Estonia‟s aid to the
energy company to finance the project. The Commission has not made a decision yet, but
preliminary studies show that the government‟s support in the amount of 1.2 billion Estonian
kroon (77 million euros) contradicts with the principles of free competition.212
One direct consequence of EU energy policy has been the legal unbundling of the Estonian
transmission system operator. The company, formerly named AS Põhivõrk and part of the Eesti
Energia, was bought by the government, put under the authority of Ministry of Economic Affairs
and Communications, and renamed OÜ Elering.213 The move was required to ensure the
transmission system operator‟s autonomy from production and retail related operations and to
increase transparency and equal treatment in the electricity market. 214 In March 2011, it was
changed into a public holding company AS Elering.215 It remains under government control but is
autonomous from energy producers. Elering is responsible for the effective and uninterrupted
operation of the transmission system. In order to avoid supply failure in case of an accident, the
company has started to construct a 126 million euro 250MW gas- fuelled reserve capacity power
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plant in Kiisa, consisting of two energy blocs. The 150 and 100MW blocs should be operational
in 2013 and 2014, respectively.216
As we can see, the development of the Estonian electricity sector until 2015 has generally
occurred and been planned in accordance with EU laws and regulations. In all policy directions,
the required legislative changes have been implemented. The reality, however, does not coincide
with the legal framework. EU legislation has had a major impact on the Estonian electricity
sector and will pose significant challenges in the future. Due to the negotiated transition periods,
no major political decisions were required immediately after the accession to the EU. But the
pressure to make a political decision over which direction Estonia should take in developing its
energy sector is increasing as the transition periods‟ expiration dates are closing in. This has also
meant that Estonian lobby in the Commission has been more active in negotiating exceptions. In
general, the activity has concentrated on two issue areas.
First, in relation to the second phase of the Emissions Trading Scheme, Estonia and Poland
contested the Commission‟s decision for the national emission quotas. For the period of 20082012, Estonia had requested a total of 24,38 million metric tons annually, albeit its verified
emissions in 2005 had been 12,62 million tons. The Commission, after revising the requests,
allowed emissions in the amount of 12,72 tons, slightly above the 2005 number.217 The
Commission‟s decision was later annulled by the European Community‟s Court of First Instance
by its 23 September 2009 decision, stating that the Commission had breached its powers.218 The
issue currently remains unresolved as the Commission rejected the latest Estonian revised
proposal in April 2011.219 The main reason behind the decision was that the quotas that Estonia
planned to allocate to enterprises were too high. Form the Estonian standpoint, however, the
Commissions quota policy is discriminating against them as its electricity sector exports a
substantial amount of electricity to both Latvia and Lithuania, states which cannot meet their
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domestic electricity demand with domestic production. Consequently, Estonian energy
companies don‟t know with how much free emission allocations they have at their disposal.
Secondly, in relation to market access, the government has lobbied for a more restrictive policy
towards producers in states outside the EU. Due to principles in the Second Energy Package,
Estonia will have to grant open access to its electricity market. Although the wholesale market
(35% of the market) has been already opened in April 2009 the retail market won‟t be opened
until January 2013, as agreed upon in the accession negotiations with the EU. This effectively
means that Russian producers have the opportunity to start trading on the Estonian market. Being
subject to lower environmental and safety standards as well as not participating in the EU ETS,
the Russian producers have a significant price advantage compared to European producers.
Because of a higher electricity prices in the EU, and good interconnections with the Baltic States,
it is likely that Russian companies will take advantage of the situation. In Estonia, this is seen as
a situation of unfair competition and provides a basis for market failure. 220 Anna- Greta
Tsahkna‟s studied Estonian large- scale consumers‟ preferences on electricity price in relation to
its origins and found that the cheapest price would be preferred, even if it originates from
Russia.221 In the case of equal prices, domestic electricity produces from renewable energy
sources would, however, be their first choice. In a June 2008 discussion paper from Estonia to the
EU, Estonia expressed concern over allowing producers in states outside the EU to access its
electricity market. Due to a possible crucial impact it would have on the Baltic electricity
markets, “it would be unacceptable to put Estonia‟s electricity supply in dependence on extensive
electricity import from a third country, for example Russia.”222 To eliminate Russian producers‟
competitive advantage, Estonia lobbied for measures that would include them in the ETS and
make them subject to the same production standards as the producers in the EU. The aim was to
ensure that substandard electricity imports from third countries “would not undermine the goals
of the EU in fighting climate change, would not distort the competition in the internal EU
electricity market and would not decrease the security of any member state.” 223 The measures,
however, contradict the principles of free trade. Also, concerns over competition distortion
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caused by cheap electricity imports and over security were limited only to Estonia due to its small
size, unique electricity system infrastructure and geographical position. For these reasons, it was
difficult to gain support for the measures at the EU level.
Undermining climate change and competitiveness of EU industries, by increasing production
costs is, however, a more common concern in the EU. The debate is characterized by the term
carbon leakage, essentially meaning that “tighter controls on CO2 emissions in Europe will drive
factories to relocate abroad,” leading to a rise of greenhouse gas emissions in countries without
emission reduction requirements.224 To address this issue, the Commission published a decision
in December 2009, determining a list of sectors and subsectors which are deemed to be exposed
to a significant risk of carbon leakage.225 Electricity production, however, was not included on
this list, even though, according to one of the criteria, even “if the sum of direct and indirect
additional costs induced by the implementation of Directive 2003/87/EC would lead to a
particularly high increase of production costs, calculated as a proportion of the gross value added,
of at least 30%,” i.e. Estonian oil shale- fired and Polish coal- fired power stations were to meet
the criteria.226
The evolution of the debate can also be observed in the Estonian Energy Market Act. Its first
version, adopted in July 2003, §30(3) states that refusing a business permit to a producer or a
(corporate) person in the Estonian electricity market may be allowed if it is based in a state that
does not have the same standards on electricity buying, electricity imports, the environment,
production costs, and in price formation. In February 2010, this provision was deleted from the
Act due to its incompatibility with EU law. From January 2014, additional technical (3) and
financial (4) provisions of cross- border transactions will be added to §30.
We can thus see how little power Estonia has over EU- wide policies, even if they are of crucial
interest to it. The Commission‟s carbon leakage decision, however, demonstrates how exceptions
can be made if an issue concerns more Member States, or in particular, larger Member States.
Hence, Estonia is, in a sense, at the mercy of interests of the majority or more powerful actors in
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the EU, even if an issue concerns its security. The example of Europeanization of the Estonian
electricity sector thus demonstrates how Estonia, being a small state, may be greatly influenced
by both unfavorable EU policies and Soviet infrastructural legacies.
A solution to securing accountability, transparency and reliability of imports form Russian
producers has been achieved through a non- EU initiative: by joining the Nord Pool electricity
exchange. Its rules do not make the Russian producers subject to higher environmental standards
but the security advantage in joining the exchange lies in the fact that a supply failure to one state
will undermine the reliability of a company in the entire Nordic- Baltic region. This presumably
decreases potential Russian willingness to politically interfere in its energy companies‟ electricity
supplies.
During the debates over the future of the Estonian electricity sector, its biggest energy company,
Eesti Energia has diversified its corporate portfolio. Having the most extensive know- how in oil
shale utilization, Eesti Energia has expanded its operations in recent years. Although the
company has produced oil from oils shale since 1980, mainly to substitute expensive masut in
district heating, but due to rising oil prices at the global market and to evolution of technologies,
an option has emerged to use oil shale oil in producing high- value fuel oil and chemicals.227 In
June 2009, Eesti Energia announced that it had developed a new oil shale oil production
technology in collaboration with a Finnish technology company Outotec.228 The collaboration
will also result in building a thermal unit to Estonia, over the years 2010- 2012, significantly
increasing its oil shale oil production capacity. The long term plan is to build three Enefit280 oil
shale oil production units in Auvere, Estonia.229 In addition, Eesti Energia has invested in
renewable energy sources, such as the 39MW Aulepa wind farm.230 In absolute numbers,
however, it is still merely a fraction of Estonian energy production as it constitutes less that 2%
of total installed capacities. Growth of electricity production from renewable sources has
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nevertheless been significant. With the completion of the Aulepa wind farm, the total electricity
produced from wind had risen to 157MW and total electricity production from renewable energy
sources had risen by 70% compared to a year earlier.231 The total capacity of projected wind
farms is currently 844.2MW, which is a rather large number that potentially could cover the total
Estonian electricity demand during the summer and half of it during winter time.232 But due to
randomness of wind farms‟ electricity production, the capacity cannot be taken into account
when calculating security of supply during peak consumption.233
Eesti Energia has also expanded its activity beyond Estonian borders. In 2006, the company
announced it had agreed to a MoU with the Jordanian government to explore the Jordanian oil
shale deposits.234 It has become the company‟s largest development project outside of Estonia.
Eesti Energia, boasting the best oil shale technology in the world, is currently undertaking
preparations to build an energy complex that will provide both electricity (900MW) and oil shale
oil (38000 barrels per day) from the Attarat Um Ghudran deposit. 235 More recently, the company
announced that the US government had approved a deal signed between Oil Shale Exploration
Company and Eesti Energia that allows the Estonian energy company to start to prepare to build
an oil shale oil production facility, with the capacity of 57000 barrels per day, in Utah.

236

The

company has also announced a deal giving it rights to explore oil shale deposits in Morocco.237
This recent and rapid expansion has generated some resonance in the Estonian media. A former
electricity and heat producer is growing into a big energy company with a global reach. Andres
Reimer of the Estonian daily Eesti Päevaleht argues that the state is no longer able to control the
energy sector.238 On the contrary, due to significantly abundant resources, Eesti Energia is the
only entity wealthy enough to order relevant research in the field, and thus able to direct policy in
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Estonia. The state‟s know- how is limited to one “star-bureaucrat,” Einari Kisel, the Deputy
Secretary General of Energy in the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications (and a
former employee of Eesti Energia), who is dependent on the energy company for information.
According to another daily, Postimees, Eesti Energia is “not excited” to invest in oils shalefuelled electricity production capacities as the profitability of producing electricity from one ton
of oil shale is five euros whereas it makes thirty euros from producing oil from the same amount
of oil shale (granted that the global oil price is at 100 dollars per barrel). 239 Hence, there is a
discrepancy between state and corporate interests: profitability does not translate into energy
security. Because Eesti Energia is owned by the state, it will have to follow the government‟s
policies but due to an increasing information and resource asymmetry, the company is able, to
some extent, to direct government energy policy.
The data shows that Estonian resistance to EU policies, and thus to Europeanization, seems to
come from security concerns. In Estonia, the trinity of policy goals- creation of an internal
market, security of supply and environmental sustainability- are contradictory. Security of supply
is being undermined by higher environmental standards and by opening of the market. The
situation is likely to lead to the demise of oil shale- fuelled electricity production, but because of
continuous demand of oil shale as a fuel in the chemical industry and in producing liquid fuels,
the oil shale sector is likely survive and is even to grow. In 2010, the Ministry of Economic
Affairs and Communications projected a small but gradual decrease in employment in Estonia‟s
mining industry.240 In the electricity industry, a 10% decrease in employment is projected, due to
opening of the electricity market and decrease in its competitiveness.241
At the same time, Annex 5 to the State Oil Shale Usage Development Plan reveals a significant
impact from the mining industry to the living conditions and life quality of the people in the
mining region. Interviews with the local population show that the people in the region see
nothing positive about the existence of oil shale mines and the general attitude towards mining is
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rather negative as the fact that “there is valuable oil shale under the Ida- Viru County‟s landowner‟s land has brought them nothing but concern and misery.”242
Interestingly, it was also opined that because the Estonian Russian- speaking population is mainly
employed in Ida- Viru County, its employment rates are “artificially” sustained as miners are
working part- time.243 The county that is mainly populated by a Russian- speaking minority
(71,4% of the county‟s population and 35,7% of the Estonian Russian- speaking minority)244, and
its industries that are the largest employers of the minority, are of vital interest from the
perspective of the government because a social crisis in the region can have a destabilizing effect
on the entire country. Integration of the Russian- speaking minority (25.5% of Estonian
population) has not been as successful as expected and a significant decrease of employment in
Ida- Viru County could further worsen to the situation. Moreover, Russia is notorious for being
concerned with how its nationals are being treated in its „near- abroad‟. But, as employment
projections and the developments in oil shale technology show, it is unlikely that the opening of
the electricity market will result in a social crisis that would have some more serious
consequences.
Hence, the most probable explanation for the government‟s resistance to EU energy policy is
concerns over energy security. However, dependence on Russian electricity supply may only be
considered as a long- term threat and only in a situation where Estonian electricity generation
capacities have been shut down or conserved, and when Russian electricity is imported to an
extent that interconnection capacity cannot compensate for a supply failure.
The EU‟s energy internal market and climate policy appears to also backfire against its objective
of improving the energy- related investment environment in the Baltic States. Due to EU climate
policy and the small size of the Baltic electricity markets, it is difficult to find foreign
investments to support building new electricity generation capacities. Eesti Energia is planning
on building two new energy blocs to the Narva Power Plants with collaboration with a French
technology company Alstom. The deal reportedly enjoys a 90 million Euro subsidy from the
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Estonian government, which is seen as unfair under the rules of open and fair competition.245
However, there is a possibility that this aid will be prohibited by the Commission. If so, the
project would have to be financed by a loan, thus substantially raising the cost of the project to
Eesti Energia that will result in higher electricity prices and an even greater competitive
advantage to Russian producers. The other example comes from Lithuania, where, similar to
Estonia, it was agreed during its accession negotiations with the EU that the Chernobyl- type
Ingalina Nuclear Power Plant, that accounted for 70% of Lithuanian electricity supply, would
have to be closed before 2010 (the first reactor was closed in 2004). The Lithuanian government
had looked for an investor that would help finance the construction of a new nuclear power plant
within a decade, and it was reported in November 2010 that it had finally found one in a Korean
energy company KEPCO.246 The company, however, unexpectedly withdrew from the deal. The
exact reasons are unknown, but Lithuanian experts tend to think that the main reasons were the
small size of the electricity market and its inability to compete with other producers in the
region.247 At the same time, the Baltiiski Nuclear Power Plant is being built in Kaliningrad, the
Russian enclave between Lithuania and Poland, at the Baltic Sea, just 15 kilometers from the
Lithuanian border.248 The capacity of the plant will consist of two 1190MW reactors, with the
total capacity of 2400MW. It is clear that the reactors are built with export in mind as the total
electricity demand of Kaliningrad is 1000MW.249 Four new reactors are also being built in
Sosnovõi Bor, near St. Petersburg, but they are meant to gradually replace the old Chernobyltype ones. Recently, Russia and Belarus signed a $9.4 billion loan agreement, according to which
a nuclear plant will be built by the Russians to Belarus, near to the Lithuanian border. 250 It will be
operational in 2018. All of these examples lead one to think that the opening of the Baltic
electricity markets, closure of installed generation capacities and higher environmental standards
create opportunities for third countries to take advantage of the emerging situation, especially
because electricity prices in the EU are significantly higher.
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As we can see, Europeanization of the Estonian electricity sector has not yet been successful
because of the Estonian government‟s resistance to change and because of the politician‟s
inability to make decisions over how to secure electricity supply in the future. More fundamental
reasons lie in the historical legacy of the electricity sector, the small size of the Estonian market,
the relative poverty of the country and the Estonian decision- makers‟ inability to decide for the
future development of the sector. Complying with the different EU energy policy directions
means a fundamental change in the electricity industry. It is difficult to make such changes in a
relatively short time and it is politically unpopular as it results in higher electricity prices,
significantly increasing both production costs for Estonian companies and living costs for the
population. A rise in electricity prices is however inevitable as they have been held at one of the
lowest levels in the EU because the environmental cost of electricity production has not been
included in the prices. The evidence appears to indicate, mainly due to the examples of Estonian
lobby against market opening for third party states and contesting emission allowances, that the
Estonian main argument against change has been energy security. Thus, hypothesis 6 (Estonia‟s
resistance to Europeanization of the electricity sector is due to energy security concerns) appears
to be correct. The situation, however, is more complex. As I have shown, concerns over
becoming dependent from Russian electricity imports can threaten Estonian energy security only
in the long run and under specific condition. Hence, the argument over energy security is perhaps
more of a pretext to protect its oil shale industry from unfair competition rather than a real
security concern. The evidence also indicates that Estonian opposition to Europeanization of the
electricity sector is not due to concerns over a possible social crisis in Ida- Viru County either.
Hence, hypothesis 7 (Estonia‟s opposition to Europeanization of the electricity sector is due to
concerns over a possible social crisis in Ida- Viru County) is also incorrect.
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Conclusions
Research indicates that Europeanization of the Estonian electricity sector has been, to an extent,
successful. The required changes in Estonian legislation have been introduced, but the relevant
government policies and the reality of the sector do not fully coincide with the principles of EU
energy- and climate policies. Thus, evidence from the process of Europeanization in the Estonian
electricity sector allows us to conclude that there are limits to Europeanization.
The literature suggests that a precondition to Europeanization is a “misfit” between EU and
Member State policies that leads to adaptational pressures for the various facilitating actors. In
the case of the Estonian electricity sector the facilitating actors are the Government of the
Republic of Estonia, which interferes in the sector through different ministries and their
subordinate agencies, and the country‟s largest energy company- Eesti Energia.
The most significant misfit between the EU and domestic level policies is the historical legacy of
the Estonian electricity sector. Namely, it is the large oil shale industrial complex that was built
during the Soviet period. It produces over 90% of Estonian electricity at one of the lowest prices
in Europe. Oil shale is sometimes considered to be a national wealth as it provides cheap
electricity and heating, jobs, revenues for the state budget and energy self- sufficiency. But
because it is powered by fossil fuels, it also generates most of Estonian air, water and land
pollution. During Soviet rule, no attention was paid to environmental protection. For this reason,
electricity production and the oil shale mines in the northeastern part of Estonia have a great
impact on the environment and living conditions of the local population. It can thus be also seen
as a national encumbrance.
The aim of the EU energy and climate policy is to incorporate the real external costs (i.e.
environmental and social costs) to the electricity price. Because of the benefits and national
importance of the oil shale complex, Estonia is opposing change despite the apparent costs of the
“national wealth.” Research shows that the continuing influence of the historical legacies on
Estonian politics is reinforced by additional conditions. The small size of the Estonian electricity
market that does not allow proper market functioning as it does not provide sufficient incentives
for large long- term investments to electricity production that would help to restructure the
Estonian electricity market while providing security of supply. The relative poverty of Estonia
has led to prioritizing high rates of economic growth that, among other things, require cheap
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production costs such as low electricity prices. To achieve this, environmental costs of electricity
production had to be ignored. Another factor is the politicians‟ inability to decide over the future
of the Estonian electricity sector. Currently, it has not been decided what will happen to the
Estonian electricity sector after the Estonian electricity market completely opens in 2013. There
is a great deal of uncertainty about the future but any decision would be unpopular as it would
inevitably lead to substantially higher electricity prices.
In order to find the abovementioned factors and to evaluate their impact on Europeanization of
the electricity market, the empirical part of the thesis was divided into three parts. This is due to
the different mechanisms of Europeanization, depending on the relationship between the EU and
the state. In the first period, when Estonia was a newly independent and in a transitional state
(1991- 1995), it showed signs of valuing the principles of a market economy with free and fair
competition in the electricity market. But because of economic constraints, the desired changes
could not have been implemented. A greater degree of economic, financial and political stability
had to be achieved first. The evidence thus shows that Estonia generally shared similar values,
beliefs and norms with the EU, but their implementation was greatly limited by the realities of the
economy and the electricity sector.
In the second period, when Estonia was an EU candidate state, the transition and restructuring of
the economy continued. Due to a greater deal of EU influence, the change was both facilitated
and accelerated by the EU. In order to meet EU requirements, Estonia quickly adopted new
legislation and implemented structural changes in the electricity sector to prepare it for
privatization. The latter process was, however, halted by Estonia‟s quick economic growth and
political struggles. Even though the process of privatization did not succeed, Europeanization of
the electricity sector continued under state ownership. To meet EU environmental and safety
standards, renovation of the oil shale power plants had begun. The EU‟s use of conditionality was
relatively weak. Estonia had to adopt relevant legislation, but it was also allowed two long
transitional periods: for market opening and renovating its old power plants. Hence, the process
of Europeanization is best described by shared values, beliefs and norms. The importance and the
unique characteristics of the Estonian electricity sector were recognized by the EU which
possibly explains the absence of extensive use of conditionality through external incentives.
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In the third period, after Estonia had become an EU Member State (2004- 2011), its economy had
substantially changed, but the limits caused by the smallness of the market, the historical legacies
and relative poverty remained. An important factor is also the fact that no further substantial
reforms were implemented or even planned during the first four years of Estonia‟s status as an
EU Member State. The most important policy documents related to the electricity sector weren‟t
signed until 2007 and 2008. Analysis shows that the political decisions to develop the electricity
sector were not far- sighted, to an extent contradicted with the principles of EU energy- and
climate policy and did not properly take into account the emerging situation in the electricity
market. Instead, the government lobbied against implementing changes that were required by the
EU. The main arguments were the substantial decrease in competitiveness of the Estonian
electricity producers and an emerging threat to Estonian energy security. Research shows that
neither of the two positions is completely adequate. The government has aimed to protect the oil
shale complex from foreign competition, but has failed to create an enabling domestic investment
environment. It appears that Eesti Energia can survive as a company by diversifying its
production portfolio. But it cannot continue to hold over 90% of the Estonian electricity market.
Thus, it is evident that the EU energy- and climate policies are at odds with reality in the case of
Estonia. For Estonia, it is not possible, at least in the short- run, to maintain domestic security of
electricity supply while meeting the EU‟s requirements of environmental sustainability and
opening its electricity market. The main drivers of developing the policy are the large Member
States such as Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Their legacies, markets and general
economic environments are, however, substantially different than that of Estonia. Thus, a „misfit‟
between EU and Estonian policies is understandable. But because the electricity sector is of vital
importance from the perspective of the state and its economy, Estonia has opposed change in its
electricity sector.
At the same time, Estonia has been able to find solutions to the challenges. It has built (or is
currently building) connections with Finland and has joined the Nord Pool electricity exchange to
provide relief for security concerns. Eesti Energia, on the other hand, has developed new
technologies that will help it to survive by shifting focus from electricity production to producing
liquid fuels that creates more revenue and enables it to maintain jobs.
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Although the Estonian electricity market is quite unique, the case study provides us with useful
insights about the process of Europeanization and about power relations in the EU. EU- wide
policies that are driven by large Member States, such as Germany, France and United Kingdom,
may not take into account peculiar conditions in the EU‟s borderlands. The Estonian case shows
that this may lead a vulnerable Member State to use arguments such as national security to gain
support to its position and to defend its interests. These conclusions may be useful for future EU
policy- making, especially when dealing with potential new candidate states such as Ukraine or
the South Eastern European States.
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